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ABSTRACT
Deciding when computer simulation models provide useful
information for decisionmakers requires some idea of how reliable the
information the simulations provide will be. Such a decision about
usefulness will depend on the type of problem, along with alternate
models that are available for providing information to decisionmakers.
Within this framework of applicability the validation process has
meaning.
In simulations where system structure is not well or
completely understood, such as large policy simulations, the researcher
is presented with a likelihood that policies and experiments on his
model are likely to influence the structure of his model. In order to
escape the errors this could cause the researcher must develop a set
of 'validation' and 'invalidation' tools which can be applied to every
policy test, and which will allow the researcher to realize when the
model must be changed.
Some possibilities for solving this 'validation' problem
exist in the more careful delineation of boundary conditions, and the
assumptions upon which the model is built. Urban Dynamics, a model by
Jay Forrester, is examined in light of these 'validation' techniques,
and found to fail to guard against changes in model structure which
are likely as a consequence of policies suggested by Forrester.
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Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies
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CHAPTER 1
Computer simulation is a form of mathematical modeling. Models
are artificial representations of the world as they abstract some part of
reality but do not recreate reality in all aspects. As a mathematical
model simulations allow one to make a set of assumptions about reality
and to test the consequences of those assumptions on a computer. As
such computer simulations are dynamic and numeric.1
Another form of mathematical models are analytic varieties
which normally do not rely on computers for their solution but on
analytic techniques of problem solving. Generally analytic models are
highly abstract and often are in a generalized form which can be applied
to many situations although it is possible to build analytic models for
some specific situations. The difficulties encountered in solving such
models often mitigate against this method, however. Simulations on the
other hand are problem dependent and since they simply extend assumptions
2
through brute force can be used in more complex situations. Analytic
models are generally used when one believes that the world can be simpli-
fied enough to meet the rigid constraints of the model. Examples are
linear programming models, queuing systems and many of the operations
research types of models. Simulations being generally imitative usually
are used in situations where the simplifications necessary for the use
of analytic models cannot be made and where analytic models will not
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allow the rich policy alternatives that exist to be tested. As an
experimental technique simulation allows a great deal of flexibility
including more exploration of the dynamic paths to various states,
although as an experimental technique finding an optimal solution is more
difficult if not impossible in certain circumstances. The experimental
feature of simulations allows for more realism in policy testing along
with a greater range of possibilities.
The differences between analytic and simulation models has
practical implications for using and validating models. For analytic
models the most important component of validating use is to make sure
that the world fits the model; for example in linear programming
checking to see if the process has a linear function. The assumptions
of analytic models are usually clear and exact. For simulations the
problem is more complex. Since the simulation model has been con-
structed to look like the world and probably to explain historical data
it is more difficult to know when the simulation is valid. The assump-
tions on which the computer simulation model are built are not as clear
as those on which the analytic model are constructed. As a consequence
it is more difficult to tell when the simulation holds and does not hold.
This leads to some important differences which will be explored in
greater detail later in this thesis.
An important difference between computer simulations and
analytic models is that simulation is an experimental technique. Gordon
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describes simulation as being "essentially an experimental problem
solving method". Before discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of the experimental approach it would be worthwhile to examine why
computer experiments may in some situations be advantageous to more
traditional experiments.
The most important reason that computer experiments are pre-
ferable to real ones is cost. For instance, suppose one desired to test
the effects of changing ordering policies of inventory for some firm
which kept large warehouses. Computer simulation might give one some
feeling for policies which meet one's objectives without incurring any
cost except the building and running ofthe computer model. In the
actual situation changing these policies might be extremely expensive
if not disastrous. This expensiveness is likely to be particularly
extreme if the policies to be tested are not intuitively clear
or incremental.
Most situations in which simulations would be useful would
have the same characteristics of cost for real experimentation. This
is particularly true in large systems such as the national economic
system. Here a second important factor becomes important, time.
Experiments on the national economy would take a great deal of
time besides the unreasonable costs involved. In a problem where the
number of experiments to be done is large, and the duration of the
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experiments are long relative to the frame of reference for decision-
making, computer simulation offers a method of doing experiments rapidly.
Even in cases where a real experiment would take a short time if there
are many to be performed computer simulation might offer a time saving
mechanism.
Doing experiments in a real environment may also be method-
ologically difficult. There exist numerous control, implementation, and
design problems, along with problems of generalizing results. Of course,
these problems also exist in experiments on computers; the difference
lies in the solution of these problems. Suppose the experimental
process will change the future response of the group being experimented
on. Doing the experiment would lead to a dead end. Doing a simulation,
however, might allow the impact of the experiment to be investigated
including the impact of sensitivity analysis and of making structural
changes in the model. In this case the use of the model might clarify
some difficult methodological problems of the experimental process.
Finally, when a system does not exist computer simulations
may be the only type of experiment available.5 The Apollo space
program comes to mind immediately, although more mundane problems such
as designing computer systems have also yielded to such experiments.6
Experimentation on systems befdre they are designed can influence the
process of design and theory.
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Simulation as an experimental technique serves two purposes.
It'allows different policies to be tested. Here a greater richness
is possible than in analytic models. Secondly, it can allow, under
certain circumstances, optimization to take place. This richness
achievable under simulation allows policies of tremendous complexity
to be tested, which means that they can also be tested under changing
conditions. Because simulations do not rely on analytic techniques
it is possible to make structural changes almost at will, which allows
more realistic conditions to be examined, as well as broadening the
types of sensitivity analysis done.
Furthermore, there exists a visibility to laymen of simulation
7
models that does not exist for analytic varieties. For clients the
imitative aspects of simulation allow them to see themselves whereas
with analytic models this is generally not so. This lack of visibility
can often stand in the way of adequate use of analytic models.
Related to the ability to test policies in a more realistic
fashion and to 'capture' more reality than analytic models is the
capability of computer simulation for directing research.8 By the use
of sensitivity analysis, which is easily performed on computer simulations,
the more important areas of study can be located. As a consequence
research can be redirected asthe needs of the computer simulation
dictate. For example, in a model of the urban area many behaviors
might be examined in detail. A simulation by revealing what areas
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are sensitive to the model could direct limited research capability
into those crucial areas, so that theory and the simulation can be
improved. Use of simulations for such heuristic explorations is generally
easier than for analytic models.
The disadvantages of simulations will be discussed in the rest
of this thesis. Generally they surround the problems of dealing and
validating such models. The gains have accompanying costs. In summary
the advantages of computer simulations over analytic models though are
many. Raser nicely summarizes them as:
(1) dealing with greater complexity
(2) having economy
(3) having clarity to users
(4) safety
(5) being able to explore unknown regions
To understand the disadvantages it will be necessary to discuss the
purposes and uses of simulation.
To discuss criteria for the use of simulation models it will
be essential to delineate the various purposes,different users and
creators of simulation models may have, since different uses may have
different criteria. If one were concerned strictly with validation this
point might be more difficult to accept, but since in this thesis
validation- will be discussed only within the framework of practical use
the more. complex epistological issues surrounding that type of validity
will be skirted. Using Bishop Occums razor the thesis will do away
with unneeded assumptions.
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One of the most common uses of simulations are for the pur-
poses of training and education.9 Examples of such simulations abound
ranging from such Urban games as APEX and CLUG to the military games used
to train future and present war commanders. Characteristically such
games attempt to provide an environment in which the actors can take on
roles of different people in a system, and attempt to make the decisions
which these 'roles' would have made. For instance, in Clug each player
is a developer who every turn (time period) can make a variety of
decisions about how to develop a city. 1 0 The players can cooperate,
ignore each other or make cartels. After each turn, a computer processes
all the decisions and the consequences are accounted for in the next
time period. The process repeats itself until the city is developed or
the game ceases to interest the players.
In other games the players may take on different roles. In a
game the author participated in given by David McClelland of the Harvard
Social Relations department each person was assigned to a group which
represented a community interest. Essentially, the simulation was a
negotiation between militants, government officials, the businessmen
and labor or the working class neighborhood. Concerned with the building
of a highway the simulation showed when negotiations break down, violence
can eruptas it did in this simulation when the Mayor's daughter was
kidnapped and then brutally killed by the radicals seeking to foster
their ideas on the city by force. Unlike the CLUG game the rules of
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action were less well developed, the accounting system was by hand.
Thus, these simulations are characterized by role playing,
an accounting system, and some sets of rules as to what actions are
tolerable. Depending on the design there may be an arbitrator who plays
nature or the players may be left to settle disputes -themselves.
Another type of training or educational simulation is slightly
different. Such simulations depend on creating an environment in which
a person can interact and feel that he is in a real system, at least
in some respects.11 Examples include flight trainers, controllers,
and moon missions. In these simulations the purpose is to expose the
actors to events that will replicate reality.
Even the purposes of this type of educational simulations can
vary. In the case of the flight trainers the purpose is to produce as
narrow a response in the actors as possible: the proper response to
the proper stimuli. In some of the psychological simulations the
purpose may be to make -a person less sure of what response is correct.
In a business game the purpose might be to give the businessman a
particular empathy with some person or group with which he presently
has none. The common characteristic is learning by the actors. It should
come then as no surprise that at least one of the measures of validity
suggested for educational simulations is the ability to learn something
realistic.12 Such a simple analysis clearly would not be enough to tell
when learning was occurring.
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It would be necessary to define what learning is desired. What
is the response the designers aimed at with the simulation? How well
did the game accomplish it? Was enough learned and was it accurate
enough? How much 'bad learning' took place? If responses which
weren't intended were learned then the simulation might not have been
very useful but rather harmful.
In examining these criteria one would like to make them as
explicit and objective as possible before testing the simulation. Such
testing is difficult needless to say. Thus, in many cases the validity
of games and simulations is a face validity - does it appear to teach
what it claims to teach? The danger in this type of validation of
criteria is that often the dysfunctional behavior learned in a situation
will be ignored unless specific tests to examine what learning took place
are set up.
Another set of simulations which exist although they are not
usually classified this way are simulations designed to improve existing
policies. The simulations are usually micro level simulations where
all testable policies are clearly understood not to effect the simulation
except through the given structure. Forrester has termed such simulations
open loop although such an appelation may not totally be deserved.1 3
The purposes of such simulations are to improve policies
regarding a highly structured operation. Examples of such simulations
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include job shop simulations, packaging of various products, most queuing
problems, and many of the industrial applications of simulation.14
In some sense the purpose of such simulations can be seen as
improving the estimations of consequence of incremental policy changes
to greater accuracy. Of course, sometimes the changes can be radical
but the nature of the goal is usually similar. The value of such
simulations will depend on their improving the decisionmaker's accuracy
in making some type of adjustment to this process.
The nature of such simulations can vary although often they are
open looped, which means that they have no feedbacks between policy
choices and model structure, and that within their own structure feedbacks
play a small role. As a consequence one does not have to worry about the
impact of policy testing on model structure (most of simulation literature
argues that this is always true in simulations; it- i.s the main thesis of
this paper that this is not true and represents a major problem to policy
oriented simulators).
The criteria then to evaluate the usefulness of this class of
simulations will be how accurately the simulation reproduces the real
world as it exists now and in the past and will exist under policy changes
in the future. A variety of tests exist which will be described later in
this thesis which could be useful in this task.
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It is fairly easy to see why this criteria dominates in the
type of problem discussed in this area. For instance, an assembly line
may be speeded up. The decisionmaker needs to know exactly how much
additional strain will be put on the other parts of the line. Accuracy
is extremely important because small inaccuracies can be disastrous.
The building of a queue even at a slow rate could mean the collapse of
the line unless one is aware that this will happen. Emphasizing accuracy
of estimation then can be seen as the prime purpose of such simulations.
The justification of this as a category may seem odd, if not
perverse to the reader. Because this thesis is examining the applicability
of simulations to various situations by their usefulness it becomes clear
that a functional category such has been defined in this case is of great
use. The main remarks of this thesis will be aimed at simulations outside
the realm of factory operation or where extremely accurate predictions
are necessary or possible. Furthermore, the types of problems encountered
in doing and validating those types of simulations are vastly different
from those used for other simulations including those used for training
and those used for large policymaking purposes.
The- final category of models to be discussed are those used for
major policy decisions. Generally, these models are characterized by
large size, undefined assumptions about the environment, and at least
to some degree shifting structure. Usually such models contain many
behavioral assumptions, and a large number of relationships which make
- 12 -
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them difficult to 'validate'. Such models seek to improve decision-
makers' ability to make decisions in a world of uncertainty. Using
Don Schon's terminology they seek to change uncertainty to calculatable
chance.1 6
Policy testing models seek to increase the awareness of the
decisionmaker. Since a decision must be made the question is whether
the decisionmaker will use the simulation model or his mental model.17
He does not have the choice not to make use of some model because a
decision about what to do is necessarily forthcoming even if that
decision is to do nothing. Necessity forces choice and choice forces
implicitly the use of some model even if that model is completely based
on intuition. The question then becomes defined as whether the
simulation model improves the ability of the decisionmaker to make
decisions. 1 8
Policy models deal in areas where the necessity for detailed
knowledge is not usually great. More often the question is what is
the general direction of change expected and in what general magnitude.
For instance the Urban Dynamics model seeks to examine what the con-
sequences of slum demolition is on in-migration of the poor. In
examining whether that model would be useful one would really be most
concerne.d with just knowing the general impact of the change; the exact
number of people deterred from coming might be nice information to know,
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but is not necessary except to tune the policy later. Where this
accuracy is not possible the general solution is imposed and incremental
changes are made to get an optimal policy. 1 9
Lowrey's model is another example of an attempt to make a policy
model. In it the concern is to explain the growth of the city and while
accuracy is more important in it than in Urban Dynamics, the same types
of characteristics about accuracy hold true. One does not expect
exactness, but rather one seeks to know the impact of changes that will
take place under various policies.
The criteria of usefulness when applied to these policy making
simulations means that they will be of use to the decisionmaker in making
decisions which will meet his objectives. A consequence of this is that
ordinarily it is necessary for the model to include all the endogenously
generated behavior relating to the issue being studied.20 Furthermore,
the model must be capable of testing a variety of potential policies,
many of which differ significantly in the way they would effect things,
the way they would be effectuated, and the way in which the implementation
will affect the world.
From this point of view policy simulations must attain flexi-
bility rather than accuracy, although of course gross errors cannot be
tolerated (grossness would be defined by the cost of the error function).
What the policy maker seeks is a reduction of the things that he doesn't
understand. Ordinarily, he will not be committed to a rigid structure
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of policy because the best method for accomplishing his goals cannot
be encompassed by any rigid structures. He simply does not understand
the world well enough to reduce it to a factory problem.
For example, the World Dynamics model is concerned with the
ecological future of earth. 2 1  It is not concerned with the prediction
of the date of the crisis, or the ultimate impact in lives lost, but
only in the formation of such a crisis out of present policies. Not that
the model is necessarily correct, but if it is the policymaker is more
concerned with the direction of the changes the model says will occur
than their exact specification.
There would even be situations where a model could not tell
a decisionmaker the exact state of the world in the future but would be
of use. An example might be a model to predict the influence of an
electioneering ploy; to be of use it only need predict the influence
a decision would have on shifts of voters. Even if the prediction of the
way people will vote is incorrect or unavailable from the model the
useful fact is predicting what type of voter shift would take place. 2 2
In conclusion it is hoped that the reader is convinced that
the usefulness of a computer simulation is problem dependent. Depending
on the type of simulation, the purpose the simulation is being done,
and the costs of errors, it would be fair to argue that computer simulation
applicability is based on the particular problem at hand. All the uses
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of computer simulations certainly have not been listed; the reader could
think of many more such as theory building, learning, having fun and so on.
The same types of arguments could be extended to those simulations in
evaluating their usefulness. All that has been attempted so far is to
show that different criteria can exist.
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CHAPTER 2
Until now the reader has had to accept the definitions used
in speaking of the "applicability" of models. In this chapter a clear
definition of what applicability, usefulness, validation, truth, and
policy oriented models will be attempted. Part of the problem in reaching
definitions of these terms is the general confusion which exists in the
literature and the widely varying definitions. Often the reason the same
words are used differently are that the authors make different assumptions
about what they are addressing. Some authors may be thinking of small
models when they speak of validation; others may be thinking of large-scale
I
policy models. [See SCSC book for various definitions.] This section
comes after a few assumptions have been made in the first chapter; it is
hoped the reader will now have some idea of the assumptions of the author.
Usually in simulation literature before using models it is
argued that the models .must be validated.2 The problem with such
arguments is that they obscure the purposes of validation by not defining
the contexts in which validation is being used. Thus one author can
argue that it is necessary to "validate specific set of insights not
3
necessarily the mechanism that generated the insights" .. ..while another
author argues that not only must the model yield outcomes similar to
4
the real world, but must use the same mechanisms to reach the outcomes.
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It is impossible to know whether the authors are really in disagreement
over what they mean by validation or whether they are talking about
different problems because they have not defined what they are
referring to.
Generally, although not in all cases, validation is taken to
mean that a model is internally consistent, and that it represents the
actual world.5 Validation of a model means arriving at agreement between
behavior of the simulation tests and the behavior of the real system.6
However, this type of definition can lead to ambiguity and confusion.
What does looking like the world mean? When does something look sufficiently
like the world to be valid?
Essentially the ambiguity comes from two different interpreta-
tions of what valid can mean - truth or usefulness. If one accepts the
'truth' criteria one may seek to define a set of objective criteria.
The usefulness criteria would lead to many different sets of validation
criteria. Later when this paper's definition of validation is put forth
these ambiguities will be resolved by changing the meaning of the words.
However, presently it is not intuitively obvious to the most
casual of observers which of the two possibilities should be adopted.
The truth criteria has some inherently appealing characteristics. For
one it would allow a standard procedure to be used in examining
simulation models. It would, therefore, remove the murkier aspects
of validation and the need for different validation strategies.
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Furthermore, its acceptance would force common discussion of the issues
of validation. Finally there exists a psychological appeal; 'is a model
true or not' is the question most laymen would ask. Therefore before
this criteria is done away with it will be necessary to present some
cogent reasons.
The problem though is that truth is nowhere adequately defined.
The whole philosophical battle between logical positivism and more
traditional philosophies has shown the difficulties of defining truth.7
When one says something is true what does one mean? If a model were
true would it reproduce all the behavior of the system? And if it
would not then when would it be true, when it was useful? Clearly if the
latte-r is the case the truth criteria has degenerated to the other side,
and if the former is true no one should bother to model since no model
will be true in all respects. The problem is that in arguing between the
various parties in the literature each one adopts his own definition of
truth, such that various degrees of the concept of usefulness are admitted,
but only implicitly, thus creating argument and confusion.
In order to erase the confusion created in the literature and
which the reader is probably beginning to feel in this paper a new
definition-of validation will be offered. Validation will.be defined as
the process of executing tests based on the criteria the simulator has
defined as useful. Validation will simply be determining whether. the
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criteria the simulator has decided to use are being met, not something
separate from the simulation itself. If this seems to beg the question
it does so very purposely. The important issue in the use of models
is whether a model is applicable to the situation which a decisionmaker
intends to use the model. This applicability will vary on the purpose
of the model, and the alternative mechanisms the decisionmaker has for
helping him to make decisions. Validation without reference to a
particular purpose is really quite meaningless. Rather this thesis
argues that for any model it will be possible to define a purpose and
from that purpose to determine tests of whether the model can help meet
that purpose. With a quick cut of Occums razor the concept of truth
will be eliminated; it is not necessary for the use of models.
This may seem to leave an enormous amount of ambiguity to
the concept of validation since none of the concepts by which it is
defined here are well understood or easy to pin down. This is probably
ture; however, the definition of validation of usefulness will serve
to take discussion away from the realm of philosophy into the more
mundane area of whether the models are meeting the goals of the whole
decisionmaking process. To test if a model is applicable, one will
define its purpose, tests to tell if that purpose is being achieved;
from that point useful arguments can grow.
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Some, although sparse,support exists in the literature for
such a definition. Brewer states that "utility is not determined by
truth criteria, rather it is measured with respect to a given set of well-
defined purposes.''8 Raser argues that isomorhism (truth) is only one
test of usefulness.9 Van Horn argues that "There is no such thing as
the appropriate validation procedure. Validation is problem dependent."10
There are problems in using usefulness as a criteria. It makes
discussion of 'validation' difficult, since even in the same class of
models such as policy-oriented models, different procedures and tests
might be applicable. Different policies might imply different tests.
For example, in using the same model of urban renewal it might be
important to develop closely fitted predictions and statistical tests to
improve relocation policymaking, although for community stability in
the same model the possible consequences of policy need only crudely
be predicted and the tests to insure this might emphasize a close fit
to structure.
The construction of tests to check usefulness (to validate
usefulness to use the new definition) is difficult. The tests used
throughout simulation, particularly in micro simulations are intended
to improve accuracy and are not of great use in policy-oriented models.
Reproduction of time series (and this will be discussed more elaborately
later) is not sufficient to check policy models. The definition of
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such tests and their application is one of the purposes of this thesis.
Other dangers exist in the usefulness definition. Churchman
argues that "the trouble with this pragmatic philosophy is that
it is correct, absolutely correct - mainly because it does not say anything
at all. What it says is do what is feasible." 12 This is true only
insofar as no attempt is made to define useful any further. Otherwise
one can readily realize the wisdom of doing what is feasible; feasibility
clearly is not intuitively obvious since many people devote their lives
to the infeasible and much debate exists about whether that concept is
correct. (The author is reminded of a defense project which is underway
where workers on it have privately pointed out to him that for the system
to function one would have to have movement three times the speed of
light. Apparently the feasibility principle is not as readily accepted
as Churchman feels it is, at least to the defence department.)
Another danger in the concept of usefulness can be more insidious
and dangerous to the practitioner of simulation. Sisson and Emshoff argue
that "If decisionmakers believe the model is useful and use it, the
analyst has done his job." 1 3 Such an attitude is extremely dangerous,
not that this is what Emshoff and Sisson intended; it would be unfair
to hold them to something they might qualify if they had' the chance.
However, such an attitude does exist in the more charlatan elements of
the profession. Clearly it is important to make sure the model does aid
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the decisionmaker in making decisions that help him reach his goal. It
may be easier to convince someone that you are helping them then to
actually do so. Unless the purpose of the simulation is to be a placebo
or laxative to decisionmakers it is necessary that the simulation meet
not only the criteria of making the decisionmaker use it but helping him
to his goal.
This discussion leads naturally into the place of simulation
as a technique of systems analysis. Systems analysis is defined in
14
terms of purpose. Generally it is characterized as a goal-seeking
method of problem solving or design. The conceptual approach used in
this thesis is part of the systems analysis philosophy.
In defining usefulness one has problems distinguishing between
folk knowledge (which may be extremely useful) and logically implied
arguments (which often are close to worthless). Clearly the
definition of usefulness with respect to policy models, which are the only
type the thesis will deal with unless explicitly stated differently,
is their ability to produce better policies. Such a statement is
necessarily true, but not extremely helpful. More useful but not
holding in every case are the various features of models that do yield
better decisions. The characteristics of such information can be very
illuminating. It has been suggested that some criteria are that
- 25 -
(1) all the data used in the simulation are
actually available
(2) actual decisions will yield the same general
consequences as simulated model
(3) simulator decision process accurately reflects
the proposed strategy and does not evoke
knowledge unavailable at the time 15
Other pieces of advice include decreasing size, or holding down
complication can yield utility.16 Many modelers argue that the model
should generally resemble the processes which are being modeled in
their entailment.17 This often does add to ease of policy analysis
along with utility.
However, further discussion of when models are useful will
be left to Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
In the interest of clarity this section will attempt to
demonstrate where all this is taking the reader. In the introduction and
the first two chapters the reader learned that the criteria for using
simulation models are different than those of other models, that usefulness
would define validation for simulation models, and that to accomplish
'validation' it would be necessary to construct tests.
The main exploratory point of the thesis is that such tests
must be executed for every policy being tested on a model. Generally,
in the simulation literature validation is a separate step from
experimentation (policy testing) in the simulation process. The argument
advanced in this thesis is that this is not true. Model structure is not
independent of policy testing, experimentation, or even implementation.
The same policy, say tearing down 5% of the slum housing as Forrester
suggests in Urban Dynamics, can have vastly different consequences
depending on the method of effectuation (the reader is warned here that this
means method; everyone would agree that incompetence can change outcomes -
in this case it means simply the technique used. An assumption of
competence is made). In order to be sure of model usefulness different
tests of validity may be necessaryor more commonly different policies
will require different mocel structures in some conditions. (That is the
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tests of validity will show that a different policy will require some
change in the model's structure). This is not an argument that this
will occur in every situation, but rather that tests of validity
(usefulness) must include mechanisms for knowing when this is necessary
since it will occur under some conditions and the model will have no way
of correcting itself, as a human's mental model can learn. Achieving
this goal will be extremely difficult.
At this point the paper will return to its normal development
and develop this thesis more later.
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CHAPTER 4
For policy-oriented models the criterion of usefulness is the
ability to improve the decisionmaking process. While academics may be
interested in simulations of this type for other purposes, the policymaker
feels that this is what the models must do.1 Ordinarily policymakers
desire models which allow them to do more than just predict future trends.
Brewer argues that this is a crucial difference between academics and
policymakers - the former are satisfied to reproduce a historical time
series which the latter does not feel is of sufficient explanatory
strength.2 The reasons behind this difference is that the design of
new policies requires at least some structural knowledge.3
For the decisionmaker to feel that a model is of use it is
necessary to be able to consider all the existing alternatives within the
structure of the model or possible alterations of the model's structure
that available policies would necessitate. Ordinarily the simulation
must have sufficient richness to also explore new alternatives which the
policymaker may think of. Without the ability to explore alternatives
the simulation simply would become a tautological justification of a given
end. In a sense this experimental feature is demanded by the nature
4
of the simulation process.
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In order to choose policies the decisionmaker must have
greater belief that a given policy will meet his objectives than
another policy. Ordinarily the decisionmaker will not really know the
direction of all the policies he has at his command, particularly in
policy areas in which simulations are built. Since in models of policy
not very much accuracy is obtainable the purpose of many simulations in
this category is to synthesize the complex forces which the policymaker
5
is unable to handle. There are, of course, notable exceptions to this
rule such as the econometric models. Even there, however, real policy
changes may not be able to be predicted; one need only look at the
recent record of the models to realize that they too can break down.6
An example of this type of policy problem could be taken from the area of
prison reform. One might wish to know what the impact of such reform
would be on crime committed. Would the deterrent that prison represents
be lost? Would the number of prisoners released returning for new
crimes committed go down? Without a simulation these questions could not
be integrated to formulate policy. By extending these questions and even
making only intelligent guesses as to the answer the decisionmaker may
have the information upon which he makes his decision improved. Of
course other factors than the shift in criminal activity may motivate
his decision, but even in that case his information has still been improved,
allowing him to make a more rational decision.
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After knowing the direction of the policy change the next
most important point is knowing the general magnitude. Suppose in the
prison reform case there will be a shift in criminal activity upwards, but
the decisionmaker because of moral reasons still would like to make the
reforms. The magnitude becomes significant then in weighting the
alternatives. Even then the decision may be difficult to make. The general
shift may not be accurate enough if the decision is very close to going
either way. In this case the decisionmaker can no longer be helped by
the model unless its accuracy is improved, which beyond a certain point
will be impossible to do with any confidence.
The elements which are necessary in this case, however, are
knowing some of the structural elements involved in the process. What
is there about prisons that deters virgins (those who have not committed
crimes) from committing crimes? What reforms would lead to prisoner
rehabilitation themselves? In order to construct a policy that is of any
use it would be necessary to know some of the structural elements of the
situation.7
Beyond the short-run consequences of most models are long-run
predictions about trends. Since most policies are not designed just to
meet immediate goals but have long-range implications and ends, the model
must have some method of predicting changes within the range of consequence.
Maintaining model validity, however, can be a difficult job. If, for
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instance, the consequences of prison reform was first a decrease in crime
but later had a psychological impact that changed the attitudes of people
outside of prison towards being put in prison (it lost its stigma because
of the reformed prisoners' ability to readapt to society) and crime
sharply increased, the decisionmaker would feel that the simulation had
failed him. In order to be of use it is necessary that the model can
be invalidated at some later point if structure is changed in some
way the model could not anticipate. In order to do this some basis for
invalidation must exist. The problem is very difficult, however, because
even if one feels relatively sure that for a given time period the model
is valid it is difficult to specify the way in which one would know when
the model is breaking down. However, once the model is used for making
the decision it will be necessary at least to some extent to monitor
the decisions which have been made by monitoring the basis (the model)
of those decisions. For humans models generally learn on their own, while
computer simulations do not.
More generally to be of use the models must be directed to
describing some particular problem or system goal.9 This, in a sense,
is a more general problem than just defining the usefulness criteria for
simulation models, but is a general analytic imperative. P.olicies should
have specific purposes, and models should be constructed to examine
those areas. Without following this usually correct piece of 'folk-
knowledge' it is difficult for the model to include all the important
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factors defining a behavior from a control point of view. Policymakers
are interested in control, not theoretical elegance.10 Returning to
the prison reform scenario, one must ask specific questions and have
specific goals. To do a model of the prison system and society would
be enormously difficult. Furthermore, "to the extent that a model is large
for complications' sake its utility is decreased.'1 1 It becomes difficult
to understand the implications of policies along with maintaining validity
over time. Even a general model of prison reform may not encompass the
proper questions, or allow the policies the decisionmaker wishes tested
to be executed. Because of the interaction of parts of social science
models it is important to ask directed questions. 1 2
The use of models then is a difficult one. The demands of the
decisionmaker can vary with his need for information, although he is
always concerned with controlling the process or influencing it with the
controls he has at hand. The psychological problems of the modeler
in constructing validity tests and the dual, invalidtiy tests (for long
run use), have only been touched on and will be returned to later in
a separate chapter. It is hoped that the reader now has the sense of
what in general models must do to be of use in decisionmaking. It will
be valuable later in more technical chapters on validation methods
to keep these necessities in mind.
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CHAPTER 5
The problem then is to decide what validation criteria can
meet the criteria necessary to make policy making simulations useful. In
order to understand the need for change from the present methods it will
be necessary to understand the present simulation process; both model
construction and validation. Without such an understanding it would be
impossible to realize the failures of present model construction, valida-
tion, and experimentation procedures.





The steps proceed recursively, although there exist feedbacks.2 There
exists a separation between experimentation and validation.3 This
separation means that one first validates the model, then decides what
experiments should be run on the model (what policies should be tested).
Naylor has defined the two processes as separate; validation is concerned
with replicating time paths, experimentation with the optimization of
4factor and responses. Naylor argues that the two processes are separate.
Validation tells one whether one can use the model, while experimentation
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or policy testing is concerned with whether the model will reach an
optimal point on the objective function. It cannot be overemphasized that
the majority of the literature sees the process as separate steps; even
where feedbacks exist they do so only in the early parts of the process;
once the experimentation phase is reached the model should be set.5
This is exhibited in several major models, including Forrester's Urban
Dynamics, Hamilton's Systems, and throughout the Conference books on
simulation.6
The validation issues and steps are based on these assumptions
of separate steps. The primary and most listed criteria for validation
is the prediction of time series.7  Naylor and Finger define three
major steps in what they call multi-Stage verification.
(1) Choose possible hypothesis
(2) verify postulates statistically 8(3) test model's ability to predict behavior statistically.
Their primary concern, however, is with step three; throughout the
literature they are quoted for such.9 The main emphasis in terms of
10
method though is to see how well a model reproduces history. Crecine
suggests that two questions be asked:
(1) Will the model yield similar outcomes as the real world?
(2) Does it use the same mechanisms to reach the outcomes?1 1
- 39 -
Such an addition as point two attempts to make sure the model has some
structural significance. Other simulation researchers put greater
emphasis into structure; Martin argues that one must have validation of
theory on which the model is based, and then validation of the computer
program.12 In the same book Hans Anderson suggests four types of
validity; structural - it resembles the world; overall - has same behavior;
technical - the model and the computer program are isomorphic; and
subjective- it is convincing.1 3
Emshoff has more far-reaching suggestions. He suggests
five methods for validation:
(1) internal validity - when exogenous inputs are held
constant does the variability range over a large
set of values? (He argues that if yes the model is
difficult to assess.)
(2) Does the model have face validity - does it appear
to be correct?
(3) How are the variables - parameter sensitivities - are
they reasonable?
(4) Hypothesis validity - do the assumed relationships
make sense?
(5) Does the model predict well?
As with most authors Emshoff returns to the prediction tes-t as the most
important. 14
Amstutz suggests almost an identical list of conditions
which are called widely different names; viability, stability, consistency,
duplication of historical conditions, and prediction of future states.15
- 40 -
Finally Poole suggests a confidence test where it is argued that the more
independent variables that exist the more dependent variables must be
predicted. 1 6
Such lists of conditions can, however, distort the main
emphasis of the authors - the prediction of events whether in the past
or the future. Without many exceptions the main criteria is that the
model fit the past data. Crecine, for instance, emphasizes the use of
goodness of fit and consequently the chi-square test.17 There exist
notable exceptions to this emphasis such as Forrester, but their
objections will be returned to later.
Given these general conditions the same authors suggest
numerous tests to accomplish this goal. Naylor lists nine major
tests:
(1) the number of turning points
(2) the timing of the turning points
(3) direction of turning points
(4) amplitude of fluctuation for time segments
(5) average amplitude over the whole series
(6) simultaneity of turning points of difterent variables
(/) average values of the variables
(8) exact value of the variables
(9) measure of the variation around the mean.18
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Most of these tests concern statistical validity. The comparison of
input-output transformations is the main tool of most validation. Van Horn
points out that the representation of means, ranges, and variance are the
crucial points in this type of analysis, and that even graphical analysis
can be useful here.19 Recently the technique of spectral analysis
has been suggested by Fishman and Kiviat, in order to surmount some of
the difficulties encountered in ordinary statistical testing procedures
(such as autocorrelation, multicollinearity, etc.) 2 0
Such statistical tests primarily are concerned with checking
'whether the simulation can reproduce historical time series data. Once
the model can achieve such reproduction then the next most emphasized
criteria is that the model also have some of the structural elements of
the real world. A test often suggested for such a purpose is the Turing
test. As originally conceived the Turing test was to be a test of
artificial intelligence. Conditions were created where a person would
ask a machine and a person questions, without knowing which was which.
When the person could not tell the difference between the machine
and the person's response the machine would be said to think.2 2
Van Horn describes an adoption of this technique to validation where
the people in the system are given data from the system and the simulation
and asked if they can tell the difference. This test would be fairly
good where people in the system have a good idea of the functional
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characteristics of the data; however, where they do not or uncertainty
exists, such as in the types of policymaking models about which this
paper is concerned, it is not likely to be the case.
Summarizing the present techniques is difficult, as one can
see from the variety of methods mentioned. However, basically in the
order of importance, simulation researchers look at (1) reproduction
of time series - accomplished with statistical tests (2) structural
validity - which is largely a question of confidence of the modeler,
but also for which the Turing test can be useful. The concern in both
cases is with the historical data however. Even in consideration of
the structure of the simulation the Turing test considers past structure
as what the model should seek to replicate. This point cannot be
overemphasized; validation as posed here is concerned with the historical
data and its inclusion into the present simulation.
There exists notable exceptions to the previous conditions,
most well known of whom is Forrester. Forrester argues that false models
could fit history but not be sufficiently rich enough to allow testing of
new policies. He argues that to be of use in making new policy,
models must represent the mechanisms of reality. However due to the
amount of noise which enters into models the ability of the models to
predict future, or even past data is severely curtailed.25 Rather models
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must be correct in all parts. The validity of a model is examined in
relationship to all variables; does the system boundary include all the
important interacting variables? Does the model endogenously produce the
behavior the simulation is examining? is the decisionmaking stream
compatible with the hypothesis of decisionmaking in the model? Forrester
is interested in the creation of the symptoms of the model. Do the same
dynamic problems occur? He suggests tests such as checking the behavior
of the intervals between peaks, time phase relationships (general
similarity of data to world), and transition characteristics of'different
modes. Forrester in a sense is more concerned with making the new system
conform with the model than the model with history.
Wright extends Forrester's criticisms of the method of
validation by prediction. "A device that reproduces or predicts need
,26
tell nothing about the process being examined." Furthermore, he
argues that data collection implies a theory of data which must be
validated; using just the data to validate the simulation is begging
the question. On a more practical level Wright argues that errors enter
into simulations in three ways; errors in measurement, errors in
specification of the simulation and errors in non-specified exogenous
and non-random forces which may affect the model's process. This
confounding of errors makes it impossible in any models where these
factors are significant to predict data accurately, although they do not
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necessarily remove the policy value of a model with them. Wright
continues his attacks by arguing that the statistical tests on which
models are validated, and variance is measured assume normality,
statistical independence, and common variance which often only hold for
simple systems.27 Hidden and missing variables which often come out
only over time make it difficult to determine which model is correct.28
DeNeufville also argues that "the statistical closeness of an
equation to a set of observational data on a system is not sufficient
test of its validity.',29 None of these critics address the problems
of the interaction of experimentation and validation. Forrester while
attacking the non-structural element of other models than his own
claims in fact that his models are structural.30 Wright is more frank
and admits that at the core all models are transfer functions. Dynamic
models, as he defines the term, he argues, show more of the structure
than black box or econometric models; they show boxes within the box. 3 1
He then goes on to argue that one can always seek a deeper level of meaning;
the problem is to determine when a sufficiently stable level has been
reached. However, nowhere does he begin to examine this question nor
face the issue of when models will be invalid. The problems to solve is what
are the sources of model instability and what methods can be used to
measure and check it so that it can be corrected, along with searching
for methods to make models more stable.
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At this point, it will be worthwhile to assess what remains
to be done. The purpose of this paper is not to prove that any specific
persons are doing validation wrongly. Therefore if the reader does not
agree with this paper assessment of present techniques that need not
keep him from accepting some of the ideas on how to improve the validation
process. Essentially it will be necessary to examine the factors in
models which influence validation, the problems they create, and some
mechanisms for correcting the problems. Then the psychological issues
along with the costs and benefits will be examined. Finally a model
will be examined in detail to illustrate some of the concepts which this
paper discussed.
The issues that have been raised here seek to show the
weaknesses and methods of simulation as presently used. The problems
which beset these techniques will be discussed more fully in the next
two chapters.
These methodological problems which will be discussed should
not remove interest in resolving the problems of actually effectuating
present techniques. Determining goodness of fit, the traditional
techniques of using only part of the data available to make the model
and then using the model to 'predict' the non-used data, and other
traditional methods have intricate problems associated with their
implementation. The resolution of such issues is important; the thrust
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of this thesis will be to raise a series of methodological problems
associated with validation even when such traditional techniques are
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The construct which most of the literature in simulation
advocates - model construction, validation, and then experimentation -
ignores some of the fundamental aspects of policy-oriented simulations.
Instead the simulations take on the tone of academic exercises. For
policymaking simulation to be of use it is necessary that they have
sufficient sophistication and power to be able to incorporate the
different alternatives and policies which decisionmakers have available
into the simulation. In formulating these policies simulation researchers
cannot just think of functional changes which they will impose on the
system, but must design real policies which are implementable. Thus
every policy will be aimed at some functional characteristics in terms
of the model but will not just have those effects, but also the effects
of the implementation of the policy. For one can never just change a
functional characteristic magically, it must be done through some
implementable means. What this means to the separation of experiments
and validation is that such a separation can no longer be assumed. The
boundary condition of side effects of implementation of a policy will
be a program with no other effect than the functional characteristic -
the rest of the policy situations will have some other effect. This will
make it necessary to formulate tests to tell when these other effects
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will have a consequence on the model itself. Even without these 'external'
effects the model might be effected by just functional experimental
manipulations. For instance, the bounds of the model's description of
reality may be fairly small and experiments outside that range might
require changes. Another case would be a policy which required simul-
taneous changes of experimental factors. In some situations this two
variable change would cause a change in the simulations structure.
Therefore it is necessary to include in any set of validation procedures
a method of deciding whether the effects of experiments and policies
would change the structure of the model.
The essential point to be made here is not that it is
unnecessary to validate the model, but rather that for the model to be
validated it must be done for every policy tested. This is not to argue
that the whole set of tests must be redone. Clearly many would still be
valid; others though must exist to test whether those tests are still
valid and the simulation remains structured the same and thus valid.
Returning to the issue of experimental process and validation
the fact that such revalidating procedures are necessary is suggested
in the statements of some of those who presently do not practise this
"experimental validation." Berger argues that computer simulation
controls all aspects of the environment. Such a statement while
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probably meant as a proof of the theory building power of simulations also
shows their weaknesses under present conditions where all aspects of
the policy experimentation and its effects on the environment and the
simulation cannot be controlled. In a British paper on gaming/simulations
it is argued that "gaming/simulation attempts to identify areas in which
relationships between variables may change; mathematical modeling is
concerned with the projection of consequences, given relationships which
are known or changing in a predetermined manner." This is only true in
the barest sense, for not all the relationships in simulations on
computers can be characterized this way, at least if they are to be
useful. The first point which must be examined in making any policy test
is to. see if present relationships will stay fixed; this is the crux of
the argument. Later it will be pointed out that continual validation
through monitoring is necessary if the simulation is to be of any use.
Perhaps the most useful arguments to examine, however, are
those given by Naylor in his book Design of Computer Experiments. Naylor
argues that "The effect of variations in response which these factors
cause in the real world have been incorporated in the computer simulation
model in the form of experimental errors or random deviations. Once we
have a model, the factors are determined and it is not possible to
experiment on the model to identify additional sources of variation.
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Furthermore, he goes on to say "In computer simulation experiments one
never has uncontrolled or unobserved factors. The role played in the
real world by uncontrolled factors is played by random character of
exogenous variables in computer simulations." 3 Finally he states that
"In a computer simulation experiment on a given model it is not possible
to include more factors for error reduction purposes. The inclusion of
more factors requires a change in the model. Once the model has been
specified all uncontrolled factors have been irretrievably absorbed
in the probabilistic specifications for the exogenous inputs." This
last point is exactly the reason every simulation must validate every
experimental possibility, for even the level at which a policy is tested
makes it a different policy and thus may incorporate new factors. It is
necessary to change a model to test different policies or even to do
sensitivity experimentation because different levels of policies might
create vastly different implementation consequences. It is also clear
that in examining the earlier statements by Naylor that these implementa-
tion effects of experimentation may introduce non-random exogenous
factors for which the model does not account nor even increase the level
of random change so that the model's stability could change. In a
model of more than one stable state their level of random input might
be an extremely important fact. Since most policies will create
additional sources of variation contrary to what the first Naylor
statement argues it is necessary to identify if this variation is crucial,
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random or non-random, and whether it will necessitate any additional
changes in the model to take it into account.
The arguments that such considerations need not be made can
only be seen in the light of assuming that the boundary conditions hold,
which implies that all models are perfect structural representations of
reality and that these structures do not change over time. While some
social scientist may believe this and may even have achieved it at
certain gross levels it is certainly not true that this is the case at
the policy level at which this paper deals.
Before exploring the possibilities of controlling for this
change in structure caused by experimentation it would be helpful to
delve into some of the causes of the changes. Often in policy-oriented
models there exists many human elements. In such systems it is necessary
to understand the interaction of individuals with the environment, and
how each affects each other.4 This is difficult to do though. Emshoff
in the same article pointed out some of the problems in the project w'Jith
which he was involved. In that case a naive model predicted outcomes
better than the simulation model that was designed to generate such
behavior. Emshoff argued that the common use of simulations was where
all the relevant factors had been identified and research interests
focused on studying the effects and performance of the system as was
affected by joint interaction of all factors; the environment was.
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completely understood. This the reader will recognize as characteristic
of models,5 defined earlier as seeking greater accuracy. Emshoff
states that most of the present thinking fails when it is applied to
simulations where the factors causing behavior are not all known.6 The
problems of such simulations are that policies can easily add factors;
the simulations in policymaking are not very well understood.
Briton Harris in discussing urban simulations brings up a
similar viewpoint. In this analysis the experimental approach consists
in searching out instances in which the environment and its informational
content differ significantly from other environments or its informational
content differ significantly from other environments or the decision
units differ significantly from other decision units, so that the
general application and fruitfulness of a theory may be examined. When
however, the behavior of the decision units as understood on the basis
of such analysis is to be explored experimentally under changed
assumptions as to policies and technology, an entirely new situation
arises. We can no longer assume that various sets of decisions are
independent of each other."7  Such a point argues that the policies
which one tests in a simulation may not be independent of the structure
of the simulation, although Harris is not clear in specifying the
implications of this fact. He does argue though that "system simulation
and decision analysis interact strongly with each other..." 8
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One can surmise from this that Harris is not completely
satisfied with present procedures.
Naylor's argument that all the random variation and
unexplained forces of the model are contained in the random specifications
of the model clearly breaks down under the conditions specified above.
Since the amount of the random influences, along with the amount and type
of non-random influences will be influenced by not only the level at
which a policy is tested, but also how that policy is to be executed
it is necessary to account for these influences in the model. Since
the, model is fixed in the conception of what factors are important to
behavior along with its treatment of random noise it is necessary to
determine whether these factors will influence the outcome of things
and thus the model. It is arrogant to assume the model will include a
description of all situations such that no changes are ever necessary.
When the informational content of different units in the model differ
they may be affected by different levels of policies in different ways
and certainly may be affected by different mechanisms of implementation
of policies differently. To assume otherwise is to assume a universal
reaction to the same stimuli. The whole literature on aggregation
attests to the difficulty of achieving this even on the grossestlevel.
One must not mistake one's goals for one's accomplishments.
Continuing with the discussion of why separation of
experimental procedures from validation cannot exist for policy-oriented
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simulations it will be worthwhile to examine the comments of Van Horn
on this area. Van Horn states that management science models have four
characteristics:9
(1) the structure and the parameters of the process
are determined by the environment, NOT the modeler
(2) part, and only part of the process depends on
physical phenomena
(3) people are part of the process directly as informa-
tion processer or decisionmakers or indirectly as
consumers
(4) the process depends on many parts and the behavior
of the process depends on the interaction between
the parts.
Most of this applies to policy-oriented simulations with a few
additions. The most important is that the process depends on the
interaction of the parts and one of the parts is the -environment, which
may be affected by the parts in the process under varying circumstances.
Thus the environment of the model can be influenced by experiments of
the modeler and influence the structure of the model. Forrester argues
that one always includes all endogenously produced behavior and thus
feels that he avoids this problem. In Urban Dynamics he even adds
that environment and model are affected in linearly additive and
nonstructural ways. Nowhere does he specify how to tell if this is
not true and if it is when the model must be changed.
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Van Horn recognizes these problems. He sees that model
construction assumes a stationary world where distributions do not
change. He gives an example for which under one system the assumptions
of a model might be true but for a policy change the assumptions might
not be true. In this case it is batch processing orders that may appear
as a non-Poisson distribution but if switched to immediate processing
they might be Poisson.12 He also points out the problem of time varying
parameters. In another example of the control of airplanes he points
out a situation where a simulation had to be changed because a policy
suggested (functionally it was speed-up work) changed the reactions of
people making the control decisions (the air controllers). 1 3
Earlier it was mentioned that the aggregation problems are
similar to the ones being investigated here. Certainly this is true
although the perspective is different. In economics to aggregate it
is necessary that variables be functionally separable.14 For example:
L B' B" P
100 20 5 1000
100 18 6 1000
200 20 5 1800
2000 18 6 1700
In this three factor problem the aggregation would break down because
of the interaction- effect. One would not expect a P of 1700 in line four.
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If one built a model it would be necessary to specify conditions under
which aggregation would break down for the production function as stated
in the first part of the example. Changing the level of factors might
change the structure of the equation. Thus the aggregation function
changed. Now it is possible to argue that,in fact, it did not change
but that the description was not adequate. This may, in fact, be
epistologically correct, however, the issue is understanding when the
description being used does not hold, for no model is a complete
description of the universe. Clearly then the area of the aggregation
problem identifies an important characteristic for the validation process;
checking when a process is functionally separable.
Krasnow, in the Design of Computer Experiments, is aware
of some of the problems discussed in this thesis. He says "The best
situation is one in which a fixed set of problems is defined in advance
to be addressed by the model and experiment."15 By this he hopes to
include all structural elements in the model for the issues being con-
sidered and avoid the problems with which this paper is concerned. He
makes explicit recognition of the problem four pages later.
"Quite often the primary experimental factors are
structural elements of the model. The comparisons
of two totally di'ssimilar storage devices in a
given computer system might require separate
structures to serve as experimental factors. Com-
parisons of operating decision rules or planning
policies might require different behavioral
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descriptions to serve as factors of an
experiment. Good model design will seek to
minimize the difficulty of establishing 16
different factor levels during an experiment.
Several extremely interesting points emerge from this quote. First is
the recognition of the impossibility of ever building an overall
structurally correct model. Second is the goal, nevertheless, is
trying to achieve this. Finally is the explicit recognition of how to
handle the problem at least in one situation. However, because Krasnow
is concerned with simulations aimed at design of non-existing systems
he does not consider the importance of his remarks to other types of
simulations, so that the type of monitoring of model validity suggested
here would be necessary. Rather he argues that one must hypothesize
any structural changes. This is true in design, not in policy-oriented
simulations where less closure exists and one is dealing with existing
systems and other steps are necessary. Furthermore, he accidentally
leaves out the case of range of the same functional policy possibly
affecting the structure of the design. Clearly this would be true in
the example he discusses of design of a computer if the device became
extraordinarily fast as to cause breakdowns in the capacity of other
parts of the computer being simulated to be able to withstand the
pressure.
Given these wide and varied reasons for the necessity of
monitoring structural change it would be worthwhile to pursue the
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theoretical reasons and structure of these arguments. Forunately
Hebert Simon provides a good guide to this area.
Simon has defined in several places including the Sciences
of the Artificial and the Structure of Social Science Models the
necessary conditions for understanding models. Generally one seeks to
make models hierarchial.17 By this it is meant that they have con-
trolled variables given variables (the environment) not influenced by
variables in the system, and endogenous variables influenced by others
in the system. From this it should be clear that the policy sensitive
situation discussed in this thesis is when the hierarchial nature of a
model breaks down, and later how to restore it. There exists an
important theorem though about such hierarchial systems which recognizes
that they are difficult to describe in social science. The essence of
the theorem is that when a model is nearly hierarchial then it can be
treated as if it were. Essentially this argument rests on the fact that
nearly decomposable (the conditions described above) systems tend in
the short run not to differ very much from totally decomposable and
18
therefore hierarchial systems. Ando and Fisher neatly sum up their
theorem. "Our theorem shows that if these feedbacks are sufficiently
weak relative to the direct influences, that is, if the theoretical
assumptions are sufficiently good approximations, there exists a time T
greater than 0 such that before T the behavior and stability of the
- 61 -
economic system can be analyzed in isolation without regard for the
difficulties raised by the presence of such feedbacks."19 The
problem then is when do the feedbacks exist so that the description being
used is invalid? If one seeks only to describe the system T can be
significantly different than 0; however, if one seeks to change policy this
may not be true.
Given these assumptions the arguments made in this thesis
gain strength. Fischer in an earlier article in the same book discusses
Liu's criticisms which led to the whole recognition of the problem.
These criticisms are directed to estimation problems and simultaneous
equation models but can be easily extended to all forms of modeling.
Liu's arguments parallel those contained in this paper.
(1) there are more variables than in an equation
(2) more equations than in the model
(3) the restriction that some parameters in a
structural equation are zero is incorrect.
20
Therefore, Liu argues that the system is underidentified. Fischer
counters that it is a matter of degree, and that when the influences
are small the problem is overcome. This clearly is true. The problem,
however, is to define weak, when weak will become strong, so that when the
model becomes invalidated it can be fixed or discarded. And although
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the identification problem is not exactly the one with which this paper
is primarily concerned it does affect the specification of simulation
models. Furthermore, the general discussion of hierarchial models is
broadly applicable to all models. Unfortunately the issue of how to
measure these areas of hierarchy are not included in the discussion nor
are the discussions extended to the logical consequences for models
which seek to change policy.
This theoretical framework then defines the situation
which it will be necessary to overcome. The reader may still not be
convinced that some policies and experiments will change the struct-ure
of models. They may argue that even if the points argued so far are
correct there exist delays in every system which make it highly unlikely
that such changes in structure will occur rapidly. This argument
however, fails to define the necessary characteristics of 'rapidly', for
its only meaningful context would be a period more than necessary for the
policy to be effectuated. This demands that there exist some test whether
this period is short enough which is a restatement of the types of tests
suggested so far. Not only will it be necessary to evaluate when a policy
must necessitate a model change, but when such a change might occur later
on and under what conditions.
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The problem of describing a time horizon over which the model
will remain valid is a difficult methodological problem. Given the
assumptions of changing model structures as a consequence of the inclusion
of unknown external variables becoming important the same problem will
exist for simulations which test policies over long periods of time.
It will not be possible to validate the model once and for good but
it will be necessary to monitor the validity of the model to see if it
is still performing to suggest good policies. Therefore any policy
which relies on time lags to be effectuated will necessitate the same type
of procedures of validation as the model did in originally testing the
policy throughout the implementation of the policy in time.
The face value of this argument becomes clear when one
considers the learning process; man does not always -respond to the same
stimuli with the same response, he is capable of learning.21 The
consequence of these arguments is that the tests to be devised in
validating the model, particularly with regard to particular policies
should also include an ability to validate models over time. From this
it would appear that the strongest tests for this task are those which
will ask the question, "under what conditions will the simulation
become invalid?"
The changing structure of models as a consequence of the
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implementation resembles the Hawthorne effect. This notorious effect in
social science was noticed when some industrial engineers decided to
test what lighting conditions were most conducive to productivity. First
they increased the intensity of the light, and productivity rose. Then
they decreased the intensity and production continued to rise. In fact,
they found that just about anything they did had a positive impact on
production. From this they deduced that some other factors than the ones
included in their model of production and lighting were at work. It
became clear that the changes themselves had changed the cognitive
assertions and the motivation of the workers. The name of this became
the Hawthorne Effect for the factory in which they were working.
The causes of Hawthorne Effect are not fully understood
although some research into the area has been conducted. An example
is Rosenthal's study of IQ and expectations.22 Essentially the Hawthorne
effect is caused by changes in what people see as the environment. They
have certain beliefs or operating procedures which are based on some
assumptions about the environment (that is what is fixed). When the
experiment or policy is done these assumptions are changed which results
in the model that would describe their behavior also being changed. In
the case of the Hawthorne experiment the workers' attitudes on how they
were being watched changed their behavior by affecting these assumptions.
When an experiment to determine the effects of lighting changes occurred
they reacted to their change in the perception of being watched (and
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probably self importance) and worked harder. If one could predict the
direction of those changes one could still run an experiment; the problem
is that too infrequently are the results of such changes known because
the assumptions which are being effected are not known and no experience
with the change has occurred which encompasses the necessary experience.
The implication of the Hawthorne effect, which is a subset
of the types of changes described earlier is that the use of large-scale
policy-oriented models may introduce even more complex problems than
experimentation. The reasons for this are that the areas which many
of the policy-oriented models are seeking to control are areas in which
many of the actors are independent and have separate goals, some of
which-may conflict with the goals of the policy being tested. If the
model is made public then the actors with different goals might change
the behavior on which the model was predicated since it would be clear
that such behavior would not longer help them to achieve the goals.
For example in a housing model a policy oriented to controlling rents
might lead to speculation and increased rents because the developers
might radically change their behavior and even use the simulation to
find a position that maximized their returns. Therefore, it is possible
that models which were made public would adduce a double Hawthorne
effect (similar to the double whammy).
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Even where the goals of the actors in the system were in
sympathy with the goals of the policy bad effects could result. In this
case actors would change their behavior to try to make the policy even
more effective; however, if behavior changed more than planned the
results could lead to an overkill and even counterintuitive consequences.
Too much could result in worsening of some conditions which have an
unstable equilibrium or more than one equilibrium.
If the model is used on a gnostic basis some of the second
order Hawthorne effects may be washed away although the original ones
described in the first sections of the paper and the previous description
of the Hawthorne effect will still exist. Ideally some simulations would
even include the 'learning' curve of the actors such that structure
remained solid. The problem, of course, is to be aware when this
rare phenomenon occurs (the validation problem). Of course, the nature
of policy-oriented simulations makes their implementation for at least
democratic systems unlikely to be gnostic. The consequence is that the
implementation effects will be both indirect in changing assumptions
on which behavior is based and also direct in giving the various actors
conscious control of behavior in many instances.
Awareness of these effects is not totally lacking from the
literature. Outside simulation there exist a great many discussions of
the problem; a notable recent one with applicability to simulation being
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Donald Campbell's "Reforms as Experiments." 2 3  Campbell is concerned
with the problems of using reforms as experiments and the problems of
doing experiments in society. As a consequence, to an experimental
technique like simulation he has much wisdom to impart. Forrester is
also aware of this problem when he says "models affect structure of
behavior."24 However, he does not extend the consequences of his point
to the rest of his work and, in reality, by arguing that all exogenous
forces should be excluded from the model negates the value of this
obse-rvation. In econometrics the importance of this point is understood.
The estimation of points is predicated on the structure of behavior
25
remaining constant.
Given the independent nature of many of the actors and
segments of policy-oriented simulations the importance of exogenous
changes in the universe also becomes important; one cannot assume a
linear response of all elements. The biggest proponent of assuming
such a linear response is Forrester in Urban Dynamics. There he argues
that because all forces will affect the environment and the model
equally the forces will have the same effect. He does not consider that
within the model are different behaviors which also might be affected
differentially. However, sinc6 different subsystems depend on different
assumptions and facts and different actors have differing cognitive
assumptions upon which they depend, it is clear that exogenous changes
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outside the model's domain may have an influence on the structure of
the model. Therefore it is necessary to monitor the environment when
instituting policies to be sure that the simulation remains valid.
Later the Urban Dynamics model will be examined to illustrate this point
clearly.
The previous discussions of model structure have led to
some very important criteria in using policy-oriented simulations.
Models have been shown to be semi-structural representations of reality;
one seeks to achieve hierarchial structural models which describe all
situations but never reaches that goal. Instead there exists a transfer
function in which some structural elements may exist but from which
certain important factors are of necessity left out. The model is still
only a vague picture of reality. Certain factors upon which the model
rests are, therefore, not included in the model but are part of the
environment and may, to some degree, be completely unknown. As a
consequence, in the testing of any policies and in doing any experiments
it is necessary to be able to know when such factors might enter into
the model and affect its structure. This is true for every test of a
policy along with the testing of policies which take time to implement
or may be continuing in nature. The problem then is to devise tests
which will include the ability to invalidate a particular model structure
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and even suggest when and how such a structure must be repaired. To
ignore this problem because it is difficult to solve means that one has
implicitly chosen the case when there are no effects and the model is
completely structural. For policy-oriented simulations this case is
extremely rare. The necessity then is to be as rigorous as possible in
devising and using tests to maintain validity in the face of the cost
constraints of the whole validation process. Within that factor it will
be necessary to examine the separation between model construction,
validation, and experimentation and make those three actions as recursive
and interacting as the problem demands.
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Achieving the goals of thorough validation is not an easy
task, particularly in light of the constraints of time and expense
which keeps the number of runs one is able to make within limits. The
validation problem has been defined as making sure the model provides
some information which is useful to decisionmakers. This task must be
accomplished in every test of the model and for every run, at least
to some minimal degree. The problem then is to devise techniques which
give the simulation researcher and the policymaker more confidence that
the model is correct. In social science it is often useful to define
under what conditions the models one has devised will break down. To
some extent the more traditional tests of validation can provide some
guideto believing in a model, although little guide when not to believe
in a particular model. Defining the appropriate conditions in which a
model will break down then means in a sense validating its structure
for the particular question at hand.
The first technique that will be discussed is the use of
boundary conditions in simulations. Clearly no modeler intends his model
to represent the state of the world under all conditions unless he
is concerned with either definitional models or trivial events (from the
point of view of policy). However, very few researchers ever define any
boundary conditions except perhaps the general one known as 'all things
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being equal' cetera paribus. This, however, really begs the question
since all things are never equal; the important thing to do is to
define what 'all things' really means, to define what must be 'equal',
in fact, for the model to hold. There are several techniques in which
this may be possible. One is to define the boundaries in which the
model can operate. In doing this one defines a certain region in which
the model is stated not to work; where all things will not be equal
enough.
There exists several methods of imposing boundary conditions
on simulations all with different implications in terms of what is being
controlled and what is recognized as not being controlled, although all
have the same effect of defining an area in which the structure of the
model is said not to hold.
The first method is to bound the domain of the input
variables. Doing this says that for certain situations the movement of
some variable to too great a variance leads to the emergence of a new
structure. For instance, in an economic model it is possible that the
movement of wages to too low a point would lead to more chaos than the
model would lead one to expect, perhaps through a revolutionary
mechanism, or perhaps through increased expenses on police to repress
revolutionary expenditures. For the purpose of the modelers it may be
necessary to bound the domain of action that the government may take in
driving down wages. On the upper bound minimum wages that exceeded
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the concept of the managers' of 'fair' might do more to curtail pro-
duction than the model might predict-because managers would begin to
resign or lose their motivation. Of course, it is possible to argue
that the model was not a correct description of reality and that the
boundary conditions should indicate a 'flip-flop' such as a step
function to a new structure would accomplish. This is an unnecessary
assertion. One might not know the new structure although one could
believe that the old would be totally wrong, or one might now wish to
consider it. Essentially the flip-flop argument is that one should
have a series of models to describe the changing structure of reality;
not a bad suggestion but not very pertinent to the problem of defining
such boundaries.
Determining the exact point of such boundaries is not an
easy task. The most important method is to try to deduce from the theory
when such boundaries should exist. More formally the bounds may be said
to exist where instability of the model has been observed in the past.
If the variance of output was extreme for some extreme value such that
the model is sensitive to small movements in the extreme the model may
not be too useful in that situation. Generally, however, the problem
is that the model is not too sensitive but the real world either is, or
the world becomes sensitive to new things. Thus no guide for establish-
ing guieds to bounds of inputs exists that is absolute; the best that can
be said is the violation of theory cannot generally be acceptable. A
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model where wages were to rise to too high a point to make the price
uncompetitive would not be allowable even if the model were a good
guide within very small rises. It would be necessary to bound the
variable.
Likewise the range of the output of a model can be bounded.
For instance, in building a weapons system it is necessary to bound
the range of the output to theoretically feasible solutions, even if
bounding the inputs is not necessary. One cannot blow up the world,
for instance, five times. This type of bounding is usually not needed
because it is not usually the case that variables are described in
worlds blown up or such metaphorical terms, but occasionally, it is
necessary, even in conservative subsystems (systems that just pass on
physical quantities). The case of Newtonian mechanics is a clear
example of this bounding of output; light at 186,000 miles per second.
Finally, it is necessary to bound the range of effects
outside model structure; under what conditions do external changes
cause change in system behavior and thus model structure. This is
addressing the cetera paribus problem even more directly and will be
returned to in a few lines.
There is no need for these boundaries to be static. Not
only could the boundary conditions within each class affect the boundary
conditions of other variables within that system, but also within the
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the other classes of boundary conditions. Therefore one could see the
value in some circumstances of having the model include a section
which has dynamic interaction of boundary conditions. The movement of
a certain variable would redefine the boundaries of some other variable.
Delineating the cetera paribus boundaries is also a difficult
task for which there is no facile solution nor one which can be derived
from the model. What is clear is that it is necessary to state these
conditions even more carefully than the other types of boundary con-
ditions since those assert when one knows the model will fail while
these are made to find out when things outside the model and, therefore,
outside the direct observation of the system will make the model fail.
The first question to ask is what are the mediating forces
upon which the functional relationships of the model depend. It is
clear that the chain of stimuli and reaction is not without implicit
assumptions about organizational context, systems of belief, and
psychological perceptions. When it is said that wages are a function
of supply and demand of labor one implicitly includes an understanding
of certain functional relationships such as the existence of a market
of accomplishing these tasks. There exist mediating mechanisms through
which the process occurs. Usually in considering the validity of a
model one is concerned with only the highest mediating functional
relationship that must exist; the underlying functional relationships
need not be described because as long as the highest on the hierarchy
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does describe things the model will maintain a good description of
behavior. This serves to terminate a needless drive to reductionist
explanations. It does pose some interesting philosophical problems but
perhaps the best way to resolve them is to make the functional relation-
ships as disctinct and intuitive as possible. It may become impossible
to do this without proceeding to lower steps of explanation. However
since the purpose of these functional relationships are to suggest
invalidation the problem becomes slightly less burdensome. When do the
tests of validation become invalid is certainly an issue and will not
be resolved here.
Given the need to develop functional guides to the assertions
upon which the model is built there are several possible steps to do
this. The first is a verbal statement of the general functional
relationships. Second is, under certain conditions, the possibility of
devising mathematical formulations of these functional relationships,
such that some indication of exactness is possible. From both of these
types of statements it is possible to develop a series of indicators
to delimit the boundaries. In the same way a series of indicators where
the allowable deviations might serve to indicate when some functional
relationship was failing and likely to be making model structure
incorrect.
Because of the visual cognition of man the making of cog-
nitive assertion maps might also prove to be fruitful to show the
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interrelationship of the various functional relationships that must be
maintained for the model to retain validity. Furthermore, it is
possible to associate such maps with flow charts of the model such that
each major loop would have specified all the major assertions affecting
it. The mediating forces would be defined, and some test of when the
relationships were likely to break down would be included. Perhaps
checking cognitive assertions is the most important form of validation,
and cognitive maps maybe is the easiest process in accomplishing this.
Finally, the inclusion of external forces might take place
by the inclusion of dummy variables which represent the counterpart to
random variables. These 'dummy variables' would be added to relation-
ships that were breaking down but would be non random influence. Such
a technique is not likely to increase model confidence, but if the
results are still within a usable range, then the model still could be
valid in the short run.
Therefore the inclusion of boundary conditions does away
with the most insidious of modeling statements; be careful with what the
model describes. For- the inclusion of boundary conditions at least
describes the meaning of such a statement and even intuitive statements
can lead to discussions and guidance. The edict to be careful is the
same as the edict to be right; a nice thought that is nirvana. The
definition of boundary conditions serves to improve the ability of the
model user to execute validation tests. By formulating the policy to be
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tested and then the implementation strategy associated it should become
possible to see if any of the consequences of the changeare outside the
range of the model as defined by the boundary conditions. Of course
there are no guarantees that this will be accomplished due to the
unforeseen effects of every policy; however, it does guarantee that the
possible effects which are foreseeable are accounted for and used to
improve decisionmaking.
Implied in this process is careful consideration of the
results of various policies. This is an important but not simple task.
The complexity of the task introduces some very intuitive notions into
the process and requires the use of a priori models of behavior. It
should be clear that this does not make it unnecessary to accomplish
the task. Considering a model of birth control it would make quite a
difference to the structure of a model whether a policy of birth control
was accomplished through the use of contraceptives or selective death.
One could envision from an a priori model some large differences in
the nature of behavior and for a model of the behavior of people under
some large changes. Needless to say the differences in most policies
in the way they achieve a functional manipulation of the variables is
not as extreme as this but in many cases very important nevertheless.
Part of the delineation of cetera paribus concerns the
second order Hawthorne effects discussed earlier. The concern with the
- 80 -
goal structure of the simulation's actors is of paramount importance
Very few simulations of policy, at least at the larger leveldescribe
situations where all the actors have the same goals. Most problems are
in fact, a consequence of a situation where a system of multiple payoffs
does not exist and where at least some of the actors see the world as
a system of zero sums.1 In such a situation the implementation of a
known policy will lead to different expectations about not only the
future of the world but the dynamic state of the world in arriving at
that future. For the simulation to still hold the situation must exist
where no superior action exists for the actors whose goals are not being
optimized. If it does the actor will use the simulation to find that
poli.cy, even if in previous situations he would have reacted to the
same stimuli in the way the model predicts to arrive at its new state.
People actions are based on their goals and their models of how the
world works. Thus one can see that unless they have no better alterna-
tives or they do not believe the results of the simulation their
behavior will change. Even in the case about not believing the simula-
tion when their actions do not for them achieve the goals they thought
it would they will begin to learn and change their behavior appropriately.
One method of overcoming this problem is to use the models
to manipulate policy outcomes gnostically. While this technique is not
compatible with democratic political structure it is theoretically
possible. Then the only effect to deal with is the learning effect.
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If the simulator is able to have a gnostic model of this effect it too
can be accommodated. Given the fact that gnostic use of the model is
unlikely in open societies (which even the Soviet Union is, by the technical
definition of knowing what policies are supposed to be doing) the user
of simulations must seek different solutions.
One possibility is to use the model to analyze what must
be done to achieve the equivalent of gnostic use and maintenance of
boundary conditions. By building implementation submodels where the
purpose of the submodel is to tell what behavior is necessary to achieve
functional manipulation of policy when Hawthorne effects are known to
exist the problems can be overcome. These submodels need not be
simulation but can be learning systems if that is more desirable.2
The problem of validating submodels is less difficult because it will
be possible to incorporate changing conditions into them. In this way
the additional efforts every policymaker would have to take could be
calculated, although certain effects of the model and implementation
problems are going to be impossible to overcome.
Going back to the birth control illustration it might be
possible to consider some of the impacts of the selective death policy
on the structure of the behavior and to build some submodels whose
purpose it would be to tell the decisionmaker what steps might be
possible to ameliorate the deteriorating situation. The problems of
what effect those steps might cause can also be considered but since
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the steps may not be functional steps in a model it might be unnecessary
or those steps might be deemed to have a negligible impact.
Without such a process it will be necessary to just consider
the total impact of the second order Hawthorne effects and to do a
sensitivity analysis, both within the structure of the model, and
changing the structure of the model if the actors have a capacity to
introduce new factors, to see the total impact of such effects. From
this it should be possible to generate a set of boundary conditions in
this area too.
The use of controlled Turing tests may also give some
additional degree of confidence. Can the decisionmaker tell the differ-
ence between the output of the real world, the model as it is to be
validated, and some dummy or modified model which is said a priori not
to be correct? Furthermore, can the validation tests in general be
subjected to different models and still distinguish the valid ones? This
in some sense is a validation of validation.
Finally, the question of defining how valid is valid enough
becomes all pervasive. Given the importance of this criteria it should
be helpful to define in a more formal way what is meant by the term good.
To determine the value of validation it is necessary to
return to the use to which validation is intended to be applied; to
make the simulation more useful. The problem then becomes one of
- 83 -
determining whether the benefits of validation outweigh the costs
involved in it. To determine this it is necessary to determine the
expected benefits of any pclicy. Then the probability of the model
being correct in assessing the outcome of the policy - the degree of
confidence. When the costs of increasing this degree of confidence
exceed the expected value of the expected benefits times the change in
the degree of confidence then too much validation is taking place. When
the points are equal validation steps should stop. Before that Baysian
analysis allows the analyst to determine when his guesses are likely
to improve the expected gain over cost by giving him some guid to the
determination of his probability estimates and their value. Of course
the whole process is an evaluative one; how much the policy is worth,
how confident one is before a validation step and after and so forth.
Nevertheless, it may give some guide in cases where extensive costs will
be incurred in each validation steps and is almost costless. None of
this is meant to gloss over the very serious practical problems involved
in such efforts - determining these points and values is difficult and
not very reliable. Still some guide to the whole mess may be worked out.
Maintaining validity for models which require a long-run
change and ongoing policy is also a difficult task. It has been argued
that boundary conditions are good methods of determining validation.
For maintaining it they may be essential. Unless some assurance is able
to be given about the validation of a model through time the policymaker
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may not have any way to know whether a model is correct, particularly
if the policy being implemented is not an intuitive policy. Therefore,
it is quite necessary to develop a series of tests which will examine
this problem. For the most part these can be the traditional tests and
the boundary conditions mentioned in this thesis.
The problem of how to determine boundary conditions and to
develop cognitive maps is not easily soluble. A practical guide is to
examine when the normal conditions did not exist and see whether the
model held during that period. If the model did not hold it is worth
examining what conditions caused its breakdown. For instance in
examining a model of migration it might be interesting to examine a
non normal situation such as World War II. By examining conditions
then it may be possible to ask questions that are impossible to answer
presently or from other time periods. Further if some of the explana-
tions of a simulation break down one might begin to look for the
cognitive assertions that did not hold for that period that occurred
in war, or it might be possible to define some boundary conditions if
the inputs were rather extreme, or unusual.
Beyond this it is possible to examine the theoretical basis
on which the model rests. Does the model have a firm basis on which
to rest? Do any of the theories on which the model rest define special
conditions which other parts of the theoretical basis of the model
- 85 -
contradict? These can provide some help.
Examining the assumptions to see if they are linear and
additive is helpful. Do the assumptions remain true under a variety
of conditions and are they essentially remaining in the same relative
position to each other? Do outside influences have about the same
effect and wash out of the relationships? An example would be the
impact of some exogenous force changing the behavior of different
groups differently or more importantly changing the theoretical basis
for some behavior such as profit maximization and markets. If the
distortion is not uniform then more likely than not the model will
yield some big problems and be invalid.
It is also helpful to try and divide the assumptions into
two or more assumptions in order to see if some interaction effects
(external entry of some factor) is likely in light of changing
conditions.
Not much more can be suggested by the author at the present
time. The point is to emphasize the direction the work must take. By
now it should be clear that there exists no easy solutions to the
problems presented earlier. The necessity is to develop more if the
models and simulations are to be usable.
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CHAPTER 8
Validation is not without its costs! Since in this paper
the only purpose of validation is to improve the usefulness of the
simulation the problem of cost enters in the process of deciding what
validation procedures should be used. It is necessary to consider the
tradeoff between validation costs and the improvement in policy which
will stem from the increased efforts. The reader should, by this time,
realize that the costs incurred in validation are by no means small
especially when the need to validate every policy change effect on the
model structure is accepted.
The costs of the validation tests are high in several respects.
The computer time used up represents a direct operational cost. The
more validation done the greater the costs will be, particularly if the
case where the validation tests depend on extensive number of runs.
The second cost is the amount of analysis which must go into the examina-
tion of the validation tests. The time consumed by such work represents
not only a direct economic cost but also a draining of energy from the
researcher. This cost can prove to be more important than the direct
economic cost.
Therefore it is necessary to weigh the value of the additional
validation efforts to the potential gains. It will be necessary to
weigh the expected values of the differential costs of decisions. This
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is complicated by the fact that until decisions are made for each
potential simulation it is impossible to do this and until models are
validated the differential decisions will be impossible to determine.
Therefore it will be necessary to develop good estimates of potential
differences and then apply Baysian probability theory to figure out
expected values.
The benefits to be derived from validation are not
necessarily small.
However certain problems enter into constructing and
executing validation tests which threaten the whole value of doing them.
Usually simulations are difficult to do and take a great deal of time.
Researchers involved with them aim to make them represent reality. In
many senses the whole validation procedure is in the building of such
models. After the time and effort put into them the researcher has a
great deal of confidence that they are correct. He has become
functionally fixated on the model.2 Instead of being able to examine
the model clearly and objectively the researcher sees it as 'his baby.'
The construction of validation tests makes it necessary to specify
conditions under which the model won't work; the researcher may be
reluctant, or unable to do this or more dangerously may define too
wide a boundary. Overcoming this problem is not trivial since the
assumptions of a simulation are rarely intuitively obvious and the
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researcher is in the best position to really examine these assumptions
critically were he able to do so. Furthermore, there will often exist
a different interpretation of the way reality works. The mechanisms
which produce the behavior under study will be questioned and the
researcher will find it difficult to alter his model particularly since
he feels he knows the most. If he has not stated the assumptions under
which the model must be valid and invalid this questioning process becomes
more difficult.
This same attitude creates a climate in which the potential
users of simulation models are not likely to believe the modelers and
their claims. An attitude of dogmatism is created which cannot be
functional to the incorporation of criticism and problems. For the
decisionmaker this attitude usually means that the model is unusable.
These issues may not seem to have a proper place here but
it is probably one of the core problems in using simulations. The
first criteria for the use of models is that they be potentially useful.
The second is that if so they be convincing. Without the proper
psychological state this is not likely to be the case. Users demand
more attention to validation which they see in the convincing mode than
research people. It will be necessary to make this jump for the
simulations to be of use.
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SUMMARY OF PART I
The purpose of the first section has been to analyze the
criteria for the use of simulations which are policy oriented. The
argument that has been advanced is that any policy oriented simulation
which improves the decisionmaking capacities of policymakers is
probably useful. In order to achieve this goal it is necessary to
validate within the goals of the decisionmaker the simulation. Thus
validation is below usefulness and is defined in pragmatic terms.
Following this line of argument it has been advanced that
the present techniques of validation are inadequate. Particularly
one aspect of this inadequacy has been investigated; the inability
of simulations to incorporate external factors. The present method
of treating experiments and policies as independent of model structure
and as never introducing new factors has been questioned on methodological
and practical grounds and found to be failing. The need to validate
a model with every policy test has been demonstrated and some preliminary
explorations -for methods of doing this have been stated. In no way
does this thesis answer all of the difficult questions it asks.
Finally some of the problems of achieving validation have
been examined, particularly from a pyschological viewpoint. From
here, however, the thesis will move in Part II to the examination of a
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simulation and application of some of the ideas and methods suggested
heretofore. Understanding the ideas in all their obscurity is difficult




In this Part the Urban Dynamics model will be examined in
detail and some of the ideas of the previous Part will be applied to
examining the model. In order to do this it will be necessary to
include a short description of the model; those who wish more detail
should consult the book. 1
Urban Dynamics has three sectors: housing, industry, and
labor. Housing and labor are both divided into three subsections:
managerial, labor, and underemployed. Industry is also divided into
three sections: new, mature, and declining. The model defines a finite
area which is developing into a major urban center. New housing and
new industry are built attracting people. This continues until the land
begins to fill up. Eventually the land fills up and the city stops
growing. Then a small decline takes place and the city is at equilibrium.
During this growth upper class (premium) housing is declining into labor
class housing and labor into underemployed and some underemployed class
housing is being destroyed. The model has each class of housing more
densely settled (subdividing apartments). Industry also declines and
employs less people. Essentially then as the city grows it attracts
more people. However when the constraint of land stops growth the balance
between housing and industry is not at equilibrium. Both decline leaving
too few jobs for the too many people in the area. Thus the simulation
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presents a theory on how decayed areas evolve.
Then the model examines some policies aimed at reviving the
city. All of these policies including manpower training and building low
income housing increase the attractiveness of the city to outside
migrants, particularly the poor. As a consequence they attract more poor
to the area until again an unfavorable balance is created. Even new
enterprise construction attracts migrants because more poor can always
crowd into the 'excess housing' which is being generated by the decline of
older housing. Forrester then goes on to suggest that the key to revival
of-the city is to destroy slums as one builds new industry. Particularly
he suggests destruction of 5% of the slum housing and an increase of 40%
in new enterprise construction. This results in a healthier balance
ecologically and prevents immigration of the poor because they have no
place to move to. As one of Forrester's co-workers stated the city
becomes an economic machine.
One gathers from the book on Urban Dynamics that. the purpose
of the simulation is to examine methods of reviving the city. In order
to do this the process by which the city developed these problems is
modeled. This serves to allow one to examine numerous alternatives of
revival.
Much criticism of the model has been generated, much of it
is hysterical in its denunciation of the model, and much shows a
penetration and understanding of urban processes which the model glosses
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over or does not understand or include. The purpose of the discussion of
Urban Dynamics in this thesis is not to comment on such criticism except
as it is -ertinent to the discussion of the application of validation
procedures discussed in this paper. Some of the criticism has been
about the lack of empirical verification of the model's structure,
parameters, and coefficients.2 For example, the treatment of migration
has been attacked on the grounds it makes housing too important. 3
Others have attacked the model for not including social factors in the
model. And still others argue that no model that does not include the
whole metropolitan region can be worth anything.
Needless to say many of these criticisms have validity. In
the following analysis it will be assumed that these problems have been
overcome and that the traditional validation steps including goodness
of fit have been successfully applied for a particular city. The
present model is a good description of the way in which this mythical
city has developed. It reproduces the time path and has the same
coefficients and parameters as the model represents it as having.
Therefore, the criticism of Forrester and his method of construction,
which has much validity, is washed away for the purposes of this
discussion.
The problem then is to describe the conditions under which
the simulation will break down. What are the boundaries of the model's
validity? To begin to answer this question it is necessary to ask what
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the model is intended to do. If the model simply seeks to describe the
growth of urban areas it may be perfectly alright (in this case it has
been defined as such). If, however, the simulation is to be used to aid
policymakers decide what policies will revive the urban area then greater
definitions of boundaries are necessary.
For instance behind all the statements of the effects of
various multipliers are assertions about the way in which they work.
The migration multipliers for the underemployed sector,for instance,
specify a certain set of conditions and assumptions about the way in
which underemployed people behave, which under various policy
alternatives may prove to be false. In the simulation underemployed
migration is influenced by five multipliers: underemployed arrivals,.
underemployed housing, public expenditure, underemployed jobs, and
4
underemployed housing program. It has already been stated that these
tables describe the world as it has been. However, in considering the
future, particularly policies in the future aimed at reviving the area,
it will be necessary to consider the assumptions on which the model
is true and what boundaries must be preserved for the model to continue
to be an adequate description of the world.
To begin the first assumption that this description of the
migration of the underemployed makes is that all other forces which might
effect the migration of people into the area are either included in this
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equation of five multipliers, or have zero effect. Of course this
zero effect could be attributed to either non-importance or to equivalent
consequences everywhere in the world and a wash out of effect. Never-
theless, the structure claims that no forces can enter the migration
equation except through one of the stated multipliers. Thus it is argued
that the state of social conditions including schools, community, drug
addiction, criminal activity and so forth has no direct effect on
migration. People's decision to migrate will not, this assumption argues,
be influenced by the danger of an area. Or the wash out argument would
be 'that all areas are equally dangerous and, therefore, that fact would
not influence the decision. In the same way other forces such as the
degree of pollution are said to not influence the decision to migrate.
Nor, for instance, is the availability of transportation allowed to
influence migration.
The argument that these forces enter into the migration
equation indirectly can be examined by looking at the loops in the model.
Nowhere do they appear. In considering the policy changes that might
be considered to revive the city it is necessary to consider whether
the programs would change the validity of these assumptions. Would the
policy, for instance, increase crime and in doing so make it enter
into people's decisions about migration? Even though it has been agreed
that in the past there was no influence of crime DIRECTLY on the model
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and places development that does not mean that an increase in crime
could not change this proposition. That is an issue which is central to
the validation issue; can it be expected that crime will have influence?
It will be necessary to be aware that the assumption of no direct
influence exists to see if the policies are likely to violate that
assumption.
So far only a small part of the difficulties has been
considered. One cannot assume that people's values will remain the
same (or to more exactness the manifestation of values). For instance,
the Public Expenditure Multiplier describes a certain kind of behavior




Essentially the shape of the curve can be said to mean that such expendi-
tures help- the poor, probably through welfare. However, the fact that
such expenditures can help the poor and in the city defined earlier
have done so does not mean that this is a logical necessity of the
government spending policies. Mike Royko in Boss, a book on Daley's Chicago,
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argues that in Chicago expenditures have risen as have taxes to the
advantage of the rich and the detriment of the poor.5 One could easily
visualize a set of expenditures such as museums, elite schools, office
services, and other benefits which would be entirely aimed at the middle
class. Some expenditures such as more police for the purpose of repression
could make life worse for the poor. Therefore, a boundary condition exists
that the curve and expenditures must primarily benefit the poor and also
be interpreted that way by them. Implicit in the table function on
Public Expenditures are sets of behavior, values and perceptions which can
be wrong and, therefore, tests and possibilities of invalidation must exist
to protect against the tables' misapplication. Only under certain con-
ditions will the table hold (conditions which existed in the past, yes,
but which may not exist in the future particularly under the revival
policies).
Another good example of the types of implicit assumptions
made about migration in each of the multipliers is in the Public Housing
Multiplier, which looks as follows:
4
12
05 ~~~~5 ( ~~2 5 3
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This multiplier assumes that underemployed see public housing as a
good attractive thing. This will depend on many things, including the
quality of the housing, its reputation, and the reputation of all public
housing nationally. If people believe that public housing is bad or that
the new public housing will be bad then it might act as a negative force
to attractiveness. For instance, in the city described so far all public
housing in the past could have been very good, dispersed, low level
housing which as the model argues was a factor that increased attract-
iveness according to the table. The assumption then holds for low level
housing (that is part of the assumption). However, a new policy might
necessarily have to include high rise housing which has negative
attractiveness to underemployed because they know its dangers, the danger
it poses to neighborhoods it is in, its disruptive social effect and so
on. Thus some assumptions about the type of public housing are necessary,
which any new policy is capable of violating. Beyond this an assumption
of how much stigma is associated with living in such housing is necessary
so that if such a stigma is changed the table can be changed. For
instance, the present. table could describe a situation where a lot of
stigma is associated with such housing. However, a new program of let's
say 25% new housing might remove that stigma, particularly if it occurs
in certain geometrical and locational patterns. In that case the
attractiveness of the area might be increased even more than the table
function would show.
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In this way it should be clear that the same types of
assumptions which surround the P.E.M. also exist in this case. The table
function describes only one case where many assumptions are necessary for
that case to be correct, and which could be in dissonance with the policies
to be tested.
In the same way there exists implicit variables which affect
the ultimate value and importance of the ones described which are of a
general nature. As the country gets wealthier there may be a tendency
to favor the suburbs and a more rural kind of life. Any policy which
raised the wealth of an area might make the urban area less attractive
than the surrounding areas, particularly if the costs of not living
in the area is not exceptional. Therefore the whole relative attractiveness,
the concept of normal attractiveness is dependent on a set of values and
facts which may not exist in the future or which could be affected by the
policies to revive the city. Improving mass transportation may foster
the movement out of the.city by making it cheaper and practical.
Many mechanisms were discussed in Part I about methods to
handle the types of problems which are being discussed here. Specifically
each structural assertion, in this case each multiplier, must be examined
to see if it needs to be bounded, and whether functional assumptions
about the model must be assumed. Doing this can be accomplished through
a variety of mechanisms previously mentioned. In addition every policy
which is to be tested must be examined to see if it is consistent with
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all the assumptions of the model. All the assumptions must also be
consistent and if some changes are necessary in the model these must be
done carefully so that other sections of the model are not invalidated.
It is important to realize that the problems which have been
discussed here in regard to underemployed migration also exist for other
areas of the model and similar types of analysis must also take place
fo those areas. For example, the sections on jobs must be examined to
see what the assumptions of those areas are. A simple example would be
the labor job ratio and its relationship to the types of industry exist-
ing in the area.6 The boundary of the ratio might depend on the amount
of export industry in the area and the relationship of the ratio to wages.
If wages are competitive then a low ratio might be impossible because
the high wages would be uncompetitive with the rest of the world. If
the policy being tested depended on the wages to attract new people this
would not happen. Therefore certain types of industry and dynamic
behavior would be eliminated from the model's valid region because the
assumptions of the model would not be wide enough to consider such
possibilities.
What has been attempted here then is to show the types of
assumptions, surrounding any specification of model structure in policy-
making models. In order to investigate the consequences of policies
it would be necessary to formulate the types of questions used here to
examine the underemployed migration area and to be able to invalidate
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the model when the conditions defined by these assumptions are not going
to hold. It will not be possible to explore all the areas of the Urban
Dynamics model in detail; such an undertaking would be a thesis in itself,
which shows some of the drawbacks of validation. Rather in the next
chapter some of the basic assumptions of the model will be examined
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In this chapter the fundamental assertions of the Urban
Dynamics model will be examined. Since it is helpful to know for what
policies the model will be scrutinized a brief description of Forrester's
revival policy will put forth first.
Essentially Forrester argues that the revival of the city will
increase its attractiveness to underemployed unless a counterbalancing
force is found. Therefore any policy should seek to revive the city and
at the same time stem the inflow of migrants. As a consequence he
recommends the demolition of 5% of the slum housing and the increase of
new enterprises at the rate of 4o%. He does not state that these programs
will cost anything nor that they must have a particular form for
implementation. "Discussion of such a program does not imply that the
demolition of slum housing should result from active intervention by the
city. It might better be accomplished by changes in the tax laws and
land zoning." Forrester is asserting that the program or policy to
implement the functional policy is not crucial to the success of the
program as long as it accomplishes the immediate functional aim.
Within the Urban Dynamics model there exist 'some assumptions,
which are very important,however, to analyzing his policies and all
policies, which it would do well to state explicitly. These assertions
are necessary assertions of any policy which would be successful to the
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urban area if his model were to be valid.
The first assumption is that there are no costs to implementa-
tion of policies. This assumption is made clear by two facts; one that
there is no feedback loops to taxes from any program but rather they are
implemented for free, and two there is no tradeoff in city services if
the program does cost money and no new taxes are raised. Total costs to
the city could remain the same if the city stopped some other services
such as street cleaning or fire protection, but this would affect the
attractiveness of the city to some group and as such is not modeled.
The implications of this no cost of implementation are'that
there are no financial costs to implementing policies. Slum demolition
is free. In Running Mailor by Flaugherty there is evidence that slum
demolition even on the small scale New York runs it costs millions. Even
Forrester's zoning or tax breaks have costs - one in law suits and
enforcement problems, the other in lost revenue. One cannot create
policies out of the air and it is a very stringent assumption that
implementation will cost nothing.
No longer though are financial costs the only kind recognized.
There exist social costs to most implementations. These are costs which
individuals bear unfairly (the draft is an example), or costs which
society also bears because the policy creates a situation which worsens
life for many people. (There is a cost to society of creating drug
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addicts-theft, loss of protective power, and less direct aesthetic
effects which may even be more important.) Thus the Urban Dynamics model
argues that there are no social costs to any policy. Neither slum
demolition and ensuing crowding, nor new enterprise construction and
loss of quality of life, have any effect whatsoever nor influence any of
the behaviors. (The two are really a collary; generally costs are
assumed to have an effect on behavior.)
As has been pointed out there is one situation where the
model could be said to include costs and that is where other municipal
services are curtailed to include the costs. This would lead to a
conclusion that such services affect none of the behaviors of the model.
Essentially the argument then becomes one that government services have
no impact on people's lives.
Of course these assumptions can be true under varying
circumstances. Some programs could be federally funded and have no
important social impact. In defining these problems and their assumptions
it is necessary to attempt to specify both what the assumptions are
and what magnitudes of contradiction could be tolerated. Merely showing
that some assumption is violated is not enough to prove the simulation
invalid but one must also examine the importance of the contradiction.
A second major assumption of the Urban Dynamics model is
that all benefits of the programs go to people living within the urban
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area being described. Essentially the model describes a situation where
no transportation network exists to put surrounding environments within
working distance of the area. All the new jobs created by a program are
taken by people within the area and all people stay within the area or
leave without taking their jobs with them. (That is they do not move
to a neighboring area and commute to their jobs.) As a collary to
this assumption no building takes place around the urban area being
described which influences the effectiveness of the programs nor the
migration of people. A zero interaction takes place between the surround-
ing environment and the urban area. The only distinction the model
makes is that there exists an environment and an urban area. No dis-
tinctions are made between the interactions an area has with its
'suburbs' and other environment. The model makes the assumption that
there is no influence that the urban area exerts on the environment,
which, in turn, influences the area.2 This assumption, of course, then
includes the near environment.
Finally within the policy of building new enterprises at
a higher rate there exists the assumption that capital is free. Increasing
new enterprise construction without changing the model means that the
model must assume that there is no cost for capital and no competition
for it. Forrester has stated in talks with the author that he believes
this to be the case and that "the world is not a zero sum game." In a
sense this assumption is related to the no cost assumption because here
I
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Forrester is also arguing that there is no cost to implementing a
policy.
There are some additional assumptions which the model needs
implicitly to stay a good representation of the world. One of the
most important concerns the second-order Hawthorne effects discussed
earlier. The model requires that there is no feedback between real
estate speculators, the model, and the future beliefs of the city's
conditions. Clearly if real estate people see revival as a possibility
then they may build excess housing, not because it is good for the city
but because they can sell it. An assumption must be made that this .will
not happen or that the city will take steps to prevent it. (Here is a
good example of the city's ability to use the model for guidance without
incurring extra costs - they could issue no new building permits.)
Some further assumptions remain to be discussed. These
deal with the area of technology change. One is that the density of the
city be stable in terms of buildings. If 'real land area' can be
expanded then the most basic assumptions of the model may be totally
incorrect. Thus the model assumes both a stable technology with regard
to housing and space technology along with a constant zoning in terms
of buildable space. If the city can improve its land area by higher
buildings or below ground structures then the land area may be expanding
in such ways as to invalidate the present policy conclusions.
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One can also see that the state of transportation and commu-
nications technology are also fixed, or fixed at least so they do not
influence the city's job structure and locational advantages. If the
costs of such transportation and communication go down then people and
industry may be able to commute in ways which would make it difficult to
assess the validity of the model. An example would be centers of
management where executives would not live or work in them but instead
work and live from their homes. Therefore, they could vacate their city
dwellings creating excess housing. On a more concrete level such develop-
ments could make cities less attractive to industry raising the cost of
attracting them.
In the same way various technological changes could influence
the land needs of industry so that the city either would not provide
adequate space (if the changes favored horizontal industry).or would need
vertical space (if changes caused the basic flows to be informational
and not product-oriented).
In the same way if the technological complexity of new
enterprise becomes such that the upgrading of underemployed would be
too expensive for industry to undertake then other sources would have to
do it for the model to remain valid, and as has been shown these would
have to be sources other than the city.
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These sets of assumptions are only the most important of
the assumptions necessary for the model to be of value in helping
policymakers decide what should happen. Certainly as has been demonstrated
there exist a series of more detailed and model specific assumptions
also necessary. In a modelthe size and complexity of the Urban Dynamics
model many assumptions will exist. One could ignore few of them in
deciding policy for even where they only postpone the ultimate outcome
that may be enough to make the decision less than the best one. Main-
taining the validity of these assumptions may seem like an impossible
task; to the extent that it is they must be integrated and brought to a
higher level so that they can be checked for in each policy and that the
system can be monitored in the future. The assumptions stated here will




1. Forrester, Urban Dynamics, page 85.
2. Ibid., p. 17.
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CHAPTER 12
In this chapter Forrester's major policy suggestions will
be examined in light of the assumptions of the model discussed in
Chapter 12. The policies will be examined to see if the possible
programs to implement them functionally will violate the boundary
conditions and assumptions set up so far.
The first policy to be examined will be slum demolition.
Essentially the impact of this policy is twofold. First it eliminates
excess housing and dampens the attractiveness of the area to the
underemployed class. Secondly it empties land which can be used for new
enterprise creating jobs and restoring the 'ecological' balance of the
area.
Several methods might exist to implement this policy. Only
a few of the more obvious ones will be examined. (Creating earthquakes,
fires, etc., will be excluded.) One possibility is to pattern tax
incentives for the destruction of such housing. By tearing the housing
down new tax shelters could be created which would make such actions
profitable to real estate people. Two assumptions of the-model might be
violated by such a policy. First there is the problem of lost revenues,
which must be made up in new taxes if the city, is not to cut services.
The cost might be greater than direct action. The second side effect,
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a sort of second order Hawthorne effect separate from the ones listed
earlier about speculation, is the possibility that real estate people
might speed the deterioration of their housing. If the profits that
could be gained by such a process were greater than holding the property
the rate of decay which the model predicts would become wrong. There-
fore any such policy would necessarily be subject to testing on this
issue. To do this more information than one would like to have to
invent would be necessary. However thepoints of testing should be clear
here; some boundary condition would have to be established.
Another method might be the buying and clearingof the
housing by the city directly. This would engender direct costs for both
the legal problems and the destruction. Besides that it could increase
hostility to the government which might influence some behaviors.
Any slum demolition policy must also be examined to see its
possible impacts on social costs. Such a policy would necessarily
increase the crowding and density of non-clear areas. Such an increase
in density could result in a number of increased social problems. For
instance, the health of the areas could suffer. This would be a case of
the underemployed bearing the costs of the program as a 'health tax.'
Crime might increase which could be looked on as a cost to everyone.
(And possibly affecting the attractiveness of the city not only to
migrants but to industry which must protect its plant.)
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Another possibility that crowding could incur is the process
of tipping if different ethnics are thrown together or if blacks are
moved into belligerent neighborhoods. Such tipping takes place when
small changes in percentage take place. As a result there could
exist more housing open to the underemployed if the labor elements are
forced by their values to move to either new housing they would have
constructed in the city or to the suburbs. Demolishing 5% of the housing
of the underemployed could cause more than an equivalent amount of the
labor housing, of a better stock, and therefore more attractive, be
opened to the underemployed.
These issues are of tremendous importance. Here it has
only been pointed out that the assumptions of the model might be violated.
To know it would be necessary to have a specific set of facts from which
boundaries could be shaped, and policy examined in detail to see if the
conclusions of the model will still hold. It is clear that not only
are the levels of homes destroyed important but their spatial character-
istics, the way in which it is done and steps taken to alleviate these
problems. What should be especially clear is that doing the policy as
Forrester claims in his book is a ridiculous idea of how the process
takes place and that functional manipulation of the variabl-e may hide the
demise of the model under any real policy. In order to achieve a validation
of any slum demolition plan it would be necessary to have a very good idea
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of the assumptions of each model and the implications of each policy,
and as much as possible in a testable way. In order for the model to
provide a useful guide to action it will be necessary to have the model
and the policies consonant in their assumptions.
The second part of Forrester's revival policy is new enter-
prise construction being increased 40%. The present assumption of
the model is that this will not cost the city anything. Several methods
might exist for creating new enterprise. One is tax breaks. By giving
firms an opportunity to expand more cheaply than normal a certain amount
of additional new enterprise can be generated. However such tax braaks
do violate an assumption of the model; that there be no cost to the city.
First of all there is the direct revenue loss, which necessarily will
extend to all new enterprise not just the additional amount, therefore
costing the city money for enterprise it would have gotten for free.
Besides this new enterprise consumes services which cost a great deal of
money. Unless one assumes no additions to the infrastructure there will
be additional costs. These must be absorbed by the city unless some
outside agency will take them.
Rather than tax breaks the city can increase taxes and
finance the attraction of capital out of them by boosterism, low .cost
loans and auxiliary services and direct investment. Here there are two
losses which are related; consumption and wages. Firms which find they
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must pay a competitive wage will not be able to offer the same wages
as elsewhere but higher because of higher taxes. In that case there will
exist no incentives for new enterprise construction and, in fact,
because the bureaucracy involved is likely to be inefficient there will
be a loss of competitive attractiveness. So unless the investment is
financed from outside the city the new enterprise construction is likely
to fail. In order to evaluate the program of course specifics are needed.
Rather than argue that necessarily the new enterprise won't work the
assumptions of the model should be tested on every policy and seen if that
policy is lacking. Here that has been done and at the crude level the
policy appears to be totally vacuous.
In the same way the costs of the capital must be examined
in light of possible competition for it. Assume that a program is con-
structed where the costs of the capital are low enough as not to affect
the validity of the model. Then the policy must be examined to see
if it would lead to action in the environment, particularly in the
'local' environment which might raise the costs. For example some tax
policy might work using the assumptions of the model. However if such
a policy was to cause the suburbs to put a better tax policy into
existence the effectiveness of the policy might be reduced so that the
cost of attracting the industry was too high. Then a retaliation to
raise the tax break effectiveness to the desired goal might cost an
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amount that proved to be extraordinary, and would violate the cost
assumptions of the model.
With the risk of too much repetition it is worth emphasizing
the point that the issue here is that it is necessary to construct
tests to see whether basic assumptions of the model are violated by the
policies to be tested. This point is the essential one of this thesis.
In terms of the particular model it should also be clear that
Urban Dynamics suffers from the non-consideration of these issues. In
the author's opinion the U.D. model lacks the definition of issues so
necessary to proper validation and policy testing. The program Forrester
recommends is not likely to do what he says it will because he does not
consider the issues which this paper brings up. Nor is it easy to do so.
In the beginning of this section the structure of the model
as an explanation of the growth of the city up until the present period
was accepted. This rather dubious step will now be examined.
Urban Dynamics is a complex model. In it Forrester has set
up a series of new definitions, not many of which he supports empirically.
For instance nowhere does he show that older, so-called mature industries
actually employ less workers per acre than new industries. No where are
the migration tables supported empirically, nor are his aging functions
for housing with any empirical support. Rather Forrester has assumed
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that his functions are correct or close enough to correct to ignore
tedious estimation and empirical validation. He argues that the para-
meters and functions are all but in a few cases insensitive in explaining
the growth of the city. To begin one wonders why there are in the model,
since without them it would be easier to see what was happening. Secondly
one must wonder how Forrester knows that they will not be important
in the future, particularly if small structural changes in the model
occur. Here is the core of Forrester's model; it assumes that it is a
perfect structural model, at least for a "few hundred" years. Such a
statement only need be examined in light of the changes in the last
several decades to wonder whether that is true.
The validation of Forrester's model would require an effort
much greater than constructing it. Just examining the specification of
functions and parameters are major tasks. Up to this point in this
Part II the concern has been focused on validation problems engendered
in policy testing. Forrester's model should illustrate the more
traditional problems and perhaps the magnitude of that task has been
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CHAPTER 13
The problems of maintaining validation may be used to the
advantage of the policymaker, in designing programs for implementation.
Every design of a program is faced with difficulties about what the
program should contain. The very problems of including all the assumptions
of the model in a policy may give guidance to important components of the
program. The model can be used to detail the side effects every program
is likely to generate and to separate the important side effects from
those with no influence. Then steps can be taken to ameliorate the
problems caused by such externalities. In the same way political problems
can be included.
In the same way it would be possible to extend the use of
the model to heuristic explorations. What will happen if they do that?
Will the assumptions of the model be voided? By using the model as a
tool of conditional prediction and to generate possible conditions facing
decisionmakers it may be possible to foresee future changes likely in
the nature of behavior.
Furthermore the problems which are introduced by this type
of validation can lead to a stronger theory. It has been argued that
operational structural models are impossible to get. However the
problems of validating models can lead to greater structure and
generality. In some sense the problems of validation can be used to choose
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between alternative conceptions of reality. In social sciences there
will often be more than one apparently good explanation of reality.
By choosing the one more readily validated and maintained as validated
there becomes a new type of Occums razor for social science. From the
difficulties of validation a few things can be learned about the nature
of social and economic theory. Particularly important is the stress
on dynamic theories which are able to include changing variables. The
more a theory depends on idealized conditions the less likely it will
be applicable.
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PART III - SUMMARY
CHAPTER 14
The purpose of this thesis has been to evaluate the use of
simulation models and to establish criteria for the use of policy oriented
models. In order to do this it has been necessary to discuss when a
model is valid for the purpose it was constructed. In this examination
it was found that models are not adequate structural representations
of reality that policies can automatically be tested in models without
thought to maintaining validity. The argument has been put forth that
'experimentation' on simulation models with various policies can entail
modifications of the simulation or model structure. Several possible
methods of examining when models become invalid have been presented, along
with a short examination of the Urban Dynamics model along this line of
attack. The remaining problem is to decide whether these efforts have
been successful, and in what ways they have failed, along with what
questions are raised by all of this.
The problem of validation of simulation models is not one
that preoccupies simulation textbook writers or researchers. An
examination of the literature usually finds a quick mention of the great
importance of the validation process but only a token discussion of the
problems involved in it. The reasons for this are not insidious; simply
very little work or thought has been done in the area that is worth noting.
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The difficulties of constructing simulations are fairly large. Data
usually is not available in the form that is needed. Usually large
parts of the process under consideration are not really understood too
well. Finally that damn world out there seems to be changing so much.
This may be the core of the problem. Clearly if the arguments of this
thesis are correct there is no reason to assume that the models built
on recreating the past should have remained constant over time and that
now suddenly they will change, bringing new forces into play. In the
past this also was happening. However the models that are built usually
attempt to explain all of the past in terms of the model. This is not
bad since if that goal can be reached it makes it more likely that the
model can be maintained more easily in the future. The problem stems
that this makes building models difficult and validating them even more
so. The brief discussion of the Forrester model should show some of the
difficulties of the process. Given the basic difficulties of even
classical validation it is not unexpected that the issues raised in this
thesis are not ones that many people like to discuss; they are busy
enough trying to get good historical validations.
It should also be clear from the thesis that the problems
raised do notyield very easily to solutions. The author of this paper
would not like to claim that he raised all the pertinent issues no less
found any convincing answers to the questions raised. It would be fair
to say that these problems will not yield to solutions very easily
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at any time. They are complex problems and cannot simply be crunched
through time consuming analysis. Given the vastness of the problems of
present validation techniques and the difficultics of the problems raised
here, with the tremendous increase in complexity that these problems
would entail if they were dealt with, and it is not clear that they are
worth pursuing at all. There may be much validity in attempting only the
possible and skipping the areas of negotiable value and skill.
However if the problems brought up in this paper are as
important as has been argued can they be ignored? The author believes
not. Central to the use of models is their ability to describe future
conditions under a variety of policy alternatives. This is more
important than historical validation. Policymakers want to know whether
the model will improve knowledge about tomorrow not whether the model fits
better than other models of yesterday. It is the very instability of
models that leads to difficulties in using them; until this problem is
attacked there is little likelihood that the models and simulations will
be of much use to anyone for the types of decisions that have been
discussed in this thesis.
One gets the impression that people outside the simulation
field understand this better than the researchers in the field. This
is understandable. People involved in simulation research most often
come out of engineering. As engineers they are used to dealing with
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systems that are more closed and where the structure is better under-
stood than in policy analysis. So they attempt to apply their knowledge
and fail to consider a world of more fuzzy causation where external
factors are almost always of some importance. Failure to consider the
nature of their understanding leads to ignoring the problems of model
instability under various policy decisions.
Where to go from here is a difficult question. In this
thesis some questions have been posed without too many answers nor too
much of an idea of how to answer them. Perhaps the answers may lie in
refc.rming the questions in another way or seeking greater understanding
of the present questions. Or perhaps the answers will never be concise
but wi-ll only be found through an awareness of the problems on the part
of researchers and strong examinations and debates about validity of
each model, among the researchers themselves and the policymakers. To
draw a conclusion would be premature.
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